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This empirical study explores the legal and non-legal factors influencing trial judges’ decisions to admit or 
exclude illegally obtained evidence under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Mining an original dataset of 1,472 reported decisions from 2013–2018, we found little evidence that they 
are affected by judges’ gender or partisan ideology. We did find, in contrast, that they are substantially 
influenced by judges’ previous professional backgrounds: Former criminal defence lawyers are more likely 
to exclude evidence than former non-criminal practitioners, who are in turn more likely to exclude 
evidence than former prosecutors. We also found significant regional disparities, with judges in Quebec, 
British Columbia, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia more likely to exclude evidence than Alberta judges. 
The study also revealed that judges are more likely to admit evidence when trying more serious charges 
and less likely to do so when trying female defendants. 
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Section 24(2) in the Trial Courts: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Legal and 
Non-legal Determinants of Excluding 
Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence in 
Canada
STEVEN PENNEY & MOIN YAHYA*
This empirical study explores the legal and non-legal factors influencing trial judges’ 
decisions to admit or exclude illegally obtained evidence under section 24(2) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Mining an original dataset of 1,472 reported decisions from 
2013–2018, we found little evidence that they are affected by judges’ gender or partisan 
ideology. We did find, in contrast, that they are substantially influenced by judges’ previous 
professional backgrounds: Former criminal defence lawyers are more likely to exclude 
evidence than former non-criminal practitioners, who are in turn more likely to exclude 
evidence than former prosecutors. We also found significant regional disparities, with judges 
in Quebec, British Columbia, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia more likely to exclude evidence 
than Alberta judges. The study also revealed that judges are more likely to admit evidence 
when trying more serious charges and less likely to do so when trying female defendants.
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IN CANADA, EVIDENCE OBTAINED by police or other state actors in violation of 
the fundamental procedural norms set out in the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms may be excluded at trial in prosecutions of criminal and regulatory 
offences if the court decides that admitting it could “bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute.”1 The exclusion of potentially reliable and probative 
evidence is a powerful remedy for police misconduct that may contribute to the 
acquittal of the factually guilty.2 It is therefore no surprise that section 24(2) of 
the Charter—the provision instantiating the exclusionary power—has generated 
vast quantities of appellate and academic commentary.
Much less has been written about the way that section 24(2) is applied 
at trial. For several decades, courts have been deciding whether to exclude 
1. S 24(2), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
2. See R v Harrison, 2009 SCC 34 at para 42 [Harrison] (“[T]he price paid by 
society for an acquittal in these circumstances is outweighed by the importance of 
maintaining Charter standards”). 
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unconstitutionally obtained evidence and explaining their reasons for doing so. 
We mined this rich dataset to identify factors influencing the decision to exclude 
or admit evidence obtained in violation of the Charter.
Ours is not the first quantitative study of section 24(2) decisions. Several 
researchers have used coding methods and descriptive statistics to examine how 
judges decide whether to exclude evidence obtained from Charter violations.3 Our 
study is the first, however, to use inferential statistical methods to isolate variables 
correlating with the exclusionary decision at trial.4 It is also the first to examine 
not only the “internal,” doctrinal variables derived from positive law, but also the 
“external,” non-legal variables (such as judges’ gender and political affiliation) 
examined in the political science and realist legal literature on adjudication. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we examine the 
jurisprudence and scholarly literature needed to provide context for the research 
questions posed, i.e., determining the significance (if any) of a host of internal and 
external variables on the exclusionary decision. Part II summarizes our research 
methodology and Part III our findings, which reveal the unimportance of judicial 
gender, party of appointment, and court level to the exclusionary decision and 
the importance of judges’ legal practice background, province, gender of the 
accused, and offence seriousness. Part IV discusses the policy implications of 
these findings and Part V concludes.
3. See Mike Madden, “Empirical Data on Section 24(2) under R v Grant” (2010) 78 Crim 
Reports (6th) 278; Mike Madden, “Marshalling the Data: An Empirical Analysis of Canada’s 
Section 24(2) Case Law in the Wake of R. v. Grant” (2011) 15 Can Crim L Rev 229 
[Madden, “Marshalling”]; Thierry Nadon, “Le paragraphe 24(2) de la Charte au Québec 
depuis Grant: si la tendance se maintient!” (2011) 86 Crim Reports (6th) 33; Ariane Asselin, 
“Trends for Exclusion of Evidence in 2012” (2013) 1 Crim Reports (7th) 74 [Asselin, 
“Trends”]; Ariane Asselin, The Exclusionary Rule in Canada: Trends and Future Directions 
(LLM Thesis, Queen’s University Faculty of Law, 2013); Nathan JS Gorham, “Eight Plus 
Twenty-Four Two Equals Zero-Point-Five” (2003) 6 Crim Reports (6th) 257; Richard 
Jochelson, Debao Huang & Melanie Murchison, “Empiricizing Exclusionary Remedies—A 
Cross Canada Study of Exclusion of Evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, Five Years After 
Grant” (2016) 63 Crim LQ 206 at 219; Benjamin Johnson, Richard Jochelson & Victoria 
Weir, “Exclusion of Evidence Under Section 24(2) of the Charter Post-Grant in the Years 
2014-2017: A Comprehensive Analysis of 600 Cases” (2019) 67 Crim LQ 57. 
4. For a recent analysis of section 24(2) decisions in five provincial appellate courts using similar 
inferential statistical methods, See Lori Hausegger, Danielle McNabb & Troy Riddell, “The 
Provincial Courts of Appeal and the Exclusionary Rule: Decision Making and Hierarchical 
Relations in the Charter Era” in Kate Puddister & Emmett Macfarlane, eds, Constitutional 
Imperatives: Contemplations on Charter Rights, Reconciliation and Constitutional Change (UBC 
Press) [forthcoming].
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I. CONTEXT
A. EMPIRICAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Few academics, lawyers, or even judges deny that some judicial decisions are 
influenced by non-textual factors; that is, those lying outside positive law. Efforts 
to describe, measure, and quantify these influences have been ongoing since at 
least the early twentieth century.5 In recent decades, however, political scientists 
and legal academics have developed a robust literature (using increasingly 
sophisticated research designs and statistical tools) investigating these external 
influences on judicial outcomes. Most of this research has been of courts in 
the United States, though there is an emergent literature in Canada and other 
jurisdictions.6 The research has also focused disproportionately on appellate courts 
as opposed to trial courts. To our knowledge, there have been no quantitative 
studies of external influence on Canadian trial decisions. That said, it is helpful 
to describe key findings from the scholarship on US appellate and trial courts and 
Canadian appellate courts in order to contextualize our study.
1. THE UNITED STATES
The most basic finding from the US research is that federally appointed appellate 
judges (i.e., from the US Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeals) tend 
to vote ideologically.7 Simply put, this means that in most legal domains there 
are high positive correlations between various ex ante and ex post measures 
of judges’ policy preferences (almost always characterized as conservative/
liberal) and similarly characterized case outcomes.8 The most common proxy 
for ex ante judicial ideology is the political party of the appointing President 
(Republican/conservative or Democrat/liberal). While there are limitations to 
5. See e.g. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Brentano’s, 1930) at 110-11; Sheldon 
Goldman, “Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-1964” (1966) 60 
American Political Science Rev 374.
6. See generally Benjamin Alarie & Andrew J Green, Commitment and Cooperation on High 
Courts: A Cross-Country Examination of Institutional Constraints on Judges (Oxford 
University Press, 2017) at 10-11 [Alarie & Green, Commitment and Cooperation].
7. See e.g. Jeffrey A Segal & Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 
Revisited (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Cass R Sunstein et al, Are Judges Political? 
An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (Brookings Institution Press, 2006).
8. See generally Lee Epstein, William M Landes & Richard A Posner, The Behavior of Federal 
Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice (Harvard University Press, 
2013) at 65-89. 
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the methodologies used,9 viewed in the aggregate, the literature reveals robust and 
enduring support for ideological judging, often referred to as the “attitudinal” 
model of adjudication.10
That said, the US research also suggests that attitudinal influences may be 
muted in certain legal domains and in the lower levels of the court hierarchy. 
At the US Supreme Court, evidence for ideological voting is strong for most 
issues, including criminal justice.11 But in the federal courts of appeal, evidence 
9. See generally Frank B Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (Stanford 
University Press, 2007) at 20-21; Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 46-47, 70-77; 
CL Ostberg & Matthew E Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court 
of Canada (University of British Columbia Press, 2007) at 45-48 [Ostberg & Wetstein, 
Attitudinal Decision Making]; Emmett MacFarlane, Governing from the Bench: The 
Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial Role (University of British Columbia Press, 
2013) at 21-26.
10. See Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 77-85; Nancy Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter 
Wiedenbeck, “The Ideological Component of Judging in the Taxation Context” (2006) 
84 Washington U L Rev 1797 at 1799-1809; Sara C Benesh & Wendy L Martinek, “State 
Supreme Court Decision Making in Confession Cases” (2002) 23 Justice System J 109 
at 110-14; Alarie & Green, Commitment and Cooperation, supra note 6 at 12-13. Note 
that many scholars differentiate between strictly “attitudinal” models of adjudication, 
in which judges decide solely on the basis of their attitudes or policy preferences, and 
“strategic” models, in which judges moderate the influence of their preferences with 
other considerations, such as their decisions’ effects on other judges and institutions, 
including legislatures. See Benjamin RD Alarie & Andrew Green, “The Reasonable Justice: 
An Empirical Analysis of Frank Iacobucci’s Career on the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007) 
57 UTLJ 195 at 202 [Alarie & Green, “The Reasonable Justice”]. Still other researchers have 
posited a more purely economic “rational choice” model of adjudication, in which judges 
seek to maximize utility along a range of parameters, including imposing their preferences as 
well as achieving myriad personal and professional goals. See e.g. Epstein, Landes & Posner, 
supra note 8. In this paper, we use the term “attitudinal” as shorthand for whatever portion of 
adjudication may be determined by a judge’s ex ante policy preferences as opposed to purely 
legal or case-specific considerations. 
11. See Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 112-13, Table 3.5 (showing substantial voting 
differences in criminal procedure cases between Republican- and Democrat-appointed 
justices with an especially strong tendency for Republican judges to vote conservatively in 
such cases); Ward Farnsworth, “Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s 
Criminal Docket” (2005) 104 Mich L Rev 67. 
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of ideological judging is weaker in criminal cases than in many other domains.12 
Attitudinal influences are weaker for all types of cases at this level than at the US 
Supreme Court13 and are weaker still at the federal trial level.14 
Several explanations have been offered for these disparities, some of which 
are backed by empirical evidence. One is that lower court judges moderate their 
ideological predilections to avoid reversal on appeal (thereby enhancing their 
professional reputation or promotional prospects).15 Indeed, there is evidence 
(both generally16 and in criminal cases17) that federal district judges’ decisions 
more closely adhere to their own ideologies (as estimated by party of appointment) 
when the court of appeal above them is comprised predominantly of judges with 
the same affiliation. Judges who face the prospect of review by a court dominated 
by the opposing party, in contrast, are less likely to decide in accordance with their 
normative preferences.18 It has also been suggested that evidence of ideological 
judging in criminal cases at the intermediate appellate level is weakened by the 
fact that defendants appeal much more frequently than prosecutors (often with 
12. See Sunstein et al, supra note 7 at 149; Jeffrey A Segal, Harold J Spaeth & Sara C Benesh, 
The Supreme Court in the American Legal System (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
at 237-38; Cross, supra note 9 at 27-29 (small but statistically significant evidence of 
ideological judging in criminal procedure cases). But see Ward Farnsworth, “The Role 
of Law in Close Cases: Some Evidence from the Federal Courts of Appeals” (2006) 86 
BUL Rev 1083; Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 168 (Republican judges more 
likely to vote conservatively in criminal than in civil cases, though differences between 
Republican and Democratic judges are small for both types); Benesh & Martinek, supra note 
10 at 122 (voluntary confession cases slightly influenced by ideology but not statistically 
significant); Jeffrey A Segal, Avani Mehta Sood & Benjamin Woodson, “The ‘Murder Scene 
Exception’—Myth or Reality? Empirically Testing the Influence of Crime Severity in Federal 
Search-and-Seizure Cases” (2019) 105 Va L Rev 543 at 577-78 (judicial ideology had a 
modest effect in predicting search and seizure exclusionary decisions in federal appellate 
courts but only in cases involving a potential life sentence or the death penalty).
13. See Jeffrey A Segal, “Judicial Behavior” in Keith E Whittington, R Daniel Kelemen & 
Gregory A Caldeira, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (Oxford University 
Press, 2008) 19 at 27; Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 168.
14. See Daniel R Pinello, “Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: 
A Meta-Analysis” (1999) 20 Justice System J 219 at 242.
15. Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 83.
16. See Kirk A Randazzo, “Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in U.S. District 
Courts” (2008) 36 American Politics Research 669.
17. See Max M Schanzenbach & Emerson H Tiller, “Strategic Judging Under the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence” (2007) 23 
JL Econ & Org 24.
18. This “reversal aversion” effect is likely much stronger for trial judges than for judges at 
intermediate appellate courts, since the former’s decisions are much more likely to be 
reviewed on appeal than the latter’s. See Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 84. 
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little merit), and as a consequence, both liberal and conservative judges most 
often vote to affirm convictions.19
It is also likely that attitudinal and other external influences on adjudication 
wane in comparison to internal legal factors as one moves down the judicial 
ladder.20 At the intermediate appellate level and (especially) at trial, case 
outcomes are more likely to be dictated by legalist considerations.21 Lower court 
judges (especially trial judges) see many more cases that can be decided based on 
straightforward applications of existing law.22 Indeed, in a comprehensive review 
of the available datasets, Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner 
found only slight evidence of partisan-ideological divergence in civil cases at 
federal district (trial) courts.23 
On the other hand, trial judges must sometimes make highly discretionary 
decisions involving contentious policy matters. For some of these decision types, 
the prospect of reversal will be slight, either because the type is so common that 
proportionally few decisions are appealed or because appeal courts treat such 
decisions deferentially.24 The section 24(2) decision arguably fits this profile. 
All else equal, we might expect these kinds of trial-level decisions to be more 
ideologically motivated than most.25 The few studies testing this hypothesis in the 
19. Ibid at 159-64. Using the party of appointment method, the ratio of conservative votes 
of federal appellate judges in criminal cases is 76 Republican to 69 Democrat; using the 
senatorial courtesy method, the ratio 79 conservative to 68 liberal). This effect is not nearly 
as pronounced at the US Supreme Court level, which has a (highly selective) discretionary 
jurisdiction and thus typically chooses only to hear criminal appeals with arguable merit (ibid 
at 234). The ratio of conservative to liberal outcomes at the US Supreme Court is 1.17 to 1; 
at courts of appeals, the ratio is 1.59 to 1 (ibid).  
20. Ibid at 231-36; Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 9 at 58.
21. Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 213-20 (the only criminal cases included in the 
dataset were capital punishment cases where Republican judges were slightly more likely 
to rule conservatively than Democratic judges, but the difference was not statistically 
significant (p>5)). 
22. Ibid at 180-83, 237. At the federal courts of appeals, there is also evidence of a substantial 
“conformity effect”: All other things being equal, judges of a particular court are more 
likely to vote in the direction of the dominant party of that court. This effect dampens the 
ideological valence of individual votes, since Democrats are more likely to vote conservatively 
when they are in the minority and vice versa (ibid at 197-99).  
23. Ibid at 213; see also Pinello, supra note 14 at 242.
24. See Corey Rayburn Yung, “Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism 
in the Federal Courts” (2011) 105 Nw UL Rev 1 at 20-21.
25. Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 11-12, 226-27, 237-38.
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United States, however, have revealed little evidence of ideological judging, even 
for discretionary trial decisions.26
Compared to the empirical literature in the United States on the influence of 
partisan affiliation and other proxies for political ideology, less research has been 
conducted on whether other aspects of judicial background (such as gender, race, 
seniority, and professional experience) influence decision making.27 The studies 
that have been done (mostly involving federal appellate courts) have tended to 
find little effect over the general range of cases.28 The consensus explanation is 
that ideology predominates in the selection process and largely cancels out other 
background factors.29
There is some evidence, however, that some background characteristics may 
have an effect in certain types of cases.30 Some studies have shown either that 
former prosecutors were more likely to render conservative decisions in criminal 
cases than other judges31 or that former criminal defence lawyers were more likely 
26. See ibid at 240-53 (for federal district courts, only very slight evidence of ideological judging 
in civil cases, but greater (but still modest) evidence in sentencing cases). Interestingly, this 
study did show that both Republican and Democratic district judges sentence more harshly 
when the court of appeals were dominated by Republicans, suggesting that reversal aversion 
may be robust even for highly discretionary trial-level decisions (ibid at 253). 
27. For exceptions, see e.g. “Judicial Background and Circuit Court Decision Making” in Cross, 
supra note 9, 69.
28. See Jeffrey A Segal & Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 
(Cambridge University Press, 1993); Epstein, Landes & Posner, supra note 8 at 169-70; 
Christina L Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D Martin, “Untangling the Causal Effects of 
Sex on Judging” (2010) 54 American J Political Science 389. Not surprisingly, there are 
exceptions. See e.g. Morris B Hoffman et al, “The Intersectionality of Age and Gender on 
the Bench: Are Younger Female Judges Harsher with Serious Crimes?” (2020) 40 Colum 
J Gender & L 128 (finding that young female judges in Colorado imposed substantially 
greater punishments for serious crimes than male or older female judges).
29. Cross, supra note 9 at 69-70, 74, 92-93.
30. See generally ibid at 73-74.
31. See C Neal Tate, “Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946–1978” (1981) 75 
American Political Science Rev 355 at 362; Stuart S Nagel, “Judicial Backgrounds and 
Criminal Cases” (1962) 53 J Crim L & Criminology 333 at 336 (among federal and state 
supreme court judges in 1955, former prosecutors voted more conservatively in criminal 
cases). But see Cross, supra note 9 at 83-85 (among federal courts of appeals judges in 
criminal cases, former assistant district attorneys voted more conservatively; but district 
attorneys, US attorneys, assistant US attorneys, and special prosecutors did not). 
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to rule liberally.32 Some researchers (but not all)33 have also found that female 
judges vote more liberally in criminal cases than men.34 
Research has also shown that, apart from attitudinal factors stemming from 
judicial attributes and backgrounds, judges may be influenced by case-specific 
factors exogenous to positive law. Some researchers have found, for example, 
that judges of both genders favour female defendants over male defendants in 
criminal cases.35 And one study of federal appellate decisions showed that judges 
were more likely to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence for more 
32. See Gregory C Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P Morriss, “Charting the Influences on the 
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning” (1998) 73 NYUL Rev 1377 
at 1470-74 (among federal district judges, former defence lawyers are more likely to find 
sentencing guidelines unconstitutional; former prosecutors more likely to uphold sentencing 
guidelines against specific type of constitutional challenge).
33. See Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 28 at 402-405 (no sex effect in capital punishment 
cases in federal courts of appeals); Sue Davis, Susan Haire & Donald R Songer, “Voting 
behavior and gender on the U.S. courts of appeals” (1993) 77 Judicature 129 (no sex effect 
in search and seizure cases).
34. See Cross, supra note 9 at 77-82 (federal courts of appeals); Donald R Songer & Kelley A 
Crews-Meyer, “Does Judge Gender Matter? Decision Making in State Supreme Courts” 
(2000) 81 Soc Science Q 750 (female Democratic judges are more likely to cast a liberal 
vote than male Democrats in criminal law and civil liberties cases; female Republicans do 
not vote differently than their male counterparts); Jeffrey J Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & 
Andrew J Wistrich, “Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight” (2011) 8 J Empirical Leg 
Studies 72 at 95 (in some experimental treatments, female judges were slightly less likely to 
find probable cause than males). See also Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, 
“Does the Judge Matter? Exploiting Random Assignment on a Court of Last Resort to 
Assess Judge and Case Selection Effects” (2012) J Empirical Leg Stud 246 at 272-74, 280-81 
(female judges vote more liberally than males in criminal cases at the Israel Supreme Court, 
although the finding was sensitive to the inclusion of a single judge).
35. Ibid at 274-75, 281; Jill K Doerner & Stephen Demuth, “Gender and Sentencing in the 
Federal Courts: Are Women Treated More Leniently?” (2014) 25 Crim Justice Policy Rev 
242; S Fernando Rodriguez, Theodore R Curry & Gang Lee, “Gender Differences in 
Criminal Sentencing: Do Effects Vary Across Violent, Property, and Drug Offences?” (2006) 
87 Soc Science Q 318; Barbara A Koons-Witt et al, “Gender and Sentencing Outcomes in 
South Carolina: Examining the Interactions With Race, Age, and Offense Type” (2014) 
25 Crim Justice Policy Rev 299. Judicial bias has also been experimentally demonstrated 
in relation to other legally irrelevant defendant characteristics. See e.g., Holger Spamann & 
Lars Klöhn, “Justice Is Less Blind, and Less Legalistic, than We Thought: Evidence from an 
Experiment with Real Judges” (2016) 45 J Leg Stud 255.
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serious offences than less serious ones, despite the fact that crime severity is not a 
doctrinally relevant consideration.36
2. CANADA
The empirical literature on judging in Canada is not as extensive as in the United 
States. The vast majority of studies have been of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
Most have shown a modest correlation between party of appointment37 and 
the ideological valence of case outcomes, but the strength of the association is 
36. Segal, Sood & Woodson, supra note 12 at 572-76. See also Andrew J Wistrich, Jeffrey J 
Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, “Heart Versus Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their 
Feelings?” (2015) 93 Tex L Rev 855 at 890-93 (experimental evidence that judges are more 
likely to suppress unconstitutionally obtained evidence for more serious offences); Jeffrey J 
Rachlinski, Andrew J Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, “Altering Attention in Adjudication” (2013) 
60 UCLA L Rev 1586 at 1614 (experimental evidence that judges are more likely to convict 
when exposed to inadmissible confession evidence when police misconduct was mild). 
37. Superior court judges (for our purposes, judges of the provincial and territorial superior trial 
courts and courts of appeal) are formally appointed by the Governor General under section 
96 of the Constitution Act, 1867. In practice, the appointments are made by the Minister of 
Justice in consultation with the Prime Minister and cabinet. Appointments to the Supreme 
Court of Canada are made by the “Governor in Council” (i.e., cabinet) under the authority 
of section 4(2) of the Supreme Court Act, and indirectly, section 101 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867. In practice, the decision is made by the Prime Minister in consultation with 
cabinet. See generally Peter McCormick, “Selecting the Supremes: The Appointment of 
Judges to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2005) 7 J App Pr & Pro 1. Provincial court 
judges are appointed by the provincial justice minister in consultation with cabinet and the 
premier. Over the years, both the federal and provincial governments have used nominating 
committees to vet prospective candidates. The workings of these committees have varied 
across time, jurisdiction, and (within the federal jurisdiction) level of court. See generally 
Lori Hausegger, Matthew Hennigar & Troy Riddell, Canadian Courts: Law, Politics, 
and Process, 2nd ed (Oxford University Press, 2015) at 135-51, 157-61; Richard Devlin, 
A Wayne MacKay & Natasha Kim, “Reducing the Democratic Deficit: Representation, 
Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary, or Towards a ‘Triple P’ Judiciary” (2000) 38 Alta L Rev 
734; Lori Hausegger et al, “Exploring the Links between Party and Appointment: Canadian 
Federal Judicial Appointments from 1989 to 2003” (2010) 43 Can J Political Science 633 at 
634-35; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Policy Preference Change and Appointments 
to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall LJ 1 at 19-20 [Alarie & Green, 
“Policy Preference Change”].
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substantially weaker than in the United States.38 Studies isolating criminal cases 
have found modest correlations at best.39 Moreover, the only study done to date of 
38. See Susan W Johnson, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Strategic Decision Making: 
Examining Justices’ Voting Patterns during Periods of Institutional Change” (2012) 42 
American Rev Can Studies 236; C Neal Tate & Panu Sittiwong, “Decision Making in the 
Canadian Supreme Court: Extending the Personal Attributes Model Across Nations” (1989) 
51 J Politics 900 at 907-908; Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change,” supra note 37; 
Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Charter Decisions in the McLachlin Era: Consensus and 
Ideology at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 47 SCLR 475 [Alarie & Green, “Charter 
Decisions in the McLachlin Era”]; Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, 
supra note 9; Donald R Songer, The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada: 
An Empirical Examination (University of Toronto Press, 2008) [Songer, Transformation of 
the Supreme Court]; Susan W Johnson, Donald R Songer & Nadia A Jilani, “Judge Gender, 
Critical Mass, and Decision Making in the Appellate Courts of Canada” (2011) 32 J Women 
Politics & Policy 237 at 249 (liberal appointees are more likely than conservative appointees 
to support criminal defendants in Supreme Court cases from 1982-2007). See also Thaddeus 
Hwong, “A Review of Quantitative Studies of Decision Making in the Supreme Court of 
Canada” (2003) 30 Man LJ 353 at 367-75 (reviewing Canadian literature). But see Donald 
R Songer & Susan W Johnson, “Judicial Decision Making in the Supreme Court of Canada: 
Updating the Personal Attribute Model” (2007) 40 Can J Political Science 911 at 923-29 
(between 1978-2000, there was no significant correlation between appointing party and 
outcomes in criminal, civil liberties, or economic cases). Researchers applying methods 
other than “party of appointment” to gauge the degree to which various appellate courts are 
“ideological” have come to the same conclusion, i.e., that the Supreme Court of Canada is 
markedly less ideological than its US counterpart. See Alarie & Green, Commitment and 
Cooperation, supra note 6 at 21; Alarie & Green, “The Reasonable Justice,” supra note 10 at 
224; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Should They All Just Get Along? Judicial Ideology, 
Collegiality, and Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2008) 58 UNBLJ 
73 at 76-78 [Alarie & Green, “Should They All Just Get Along?”]; Ostberg & Wetstein, 
Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 9 at 191-92, 204-205; Songer, Transformation of 
the Supreme Court, supra note 38 at 7-9, 161, 194, 247-49.
39. See Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change,” supra note 37 at 28-36 (finding 
conservative-appointed Supreme Court of Canada judges voted only slightly more 
conservatively than liberal-appointed judges for both appeals generally and criminal cases); 
Nadia A Jilani, Donald R Songer & Susan W. Johnson, “Gender, Consciousness Raising, 
and Decision Making on the Supreme Court of Canada” (2010) 94 Judicature 59 at 66 
(liberal-appointed judges voted more liberally than conservative ones in criminal cases from 
1976-2007); Alarie & Green, “Charter Decisions in the McLachlin Era,” supra note 38 at 
490-92, Table 1 (finding only modest partisan differences, mostly attributable to equality 
rights cases, between liberal- and conservative-appointed judges in Charter cases decided 
between 2000-2009 (including criminal cases)); Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision 
Making, supra note 9 at 64, Table 3.4, 214-17 (modest evidence of partisan-ideological 
voting in criminal cases); Johnson, supra note 38 at 247 (liberal-appointed judges more 
likely to support liberal outcomes in criminal cases, but the effect is substantially larger in 
pre-Charter cases); Songer, Transformation of the Supreme Court, supra note 38 at 196-201 
(modest correlation between appointing party and outcomes in non-unanimous criminal 
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Supreme Court decisions involving criminal procedural rights found no evidence 
of the expected ideological divide, i.e., that conservative-appointed judges favour 
the prosecution. For the years 1984–2003, C.L. Ostberg and Matthew E. Wetstein 
found either no association between party of appointment and outcomes (in 
“right to counsel” cases) or a modest negative correlation (in “search and seizure” 
cases).40 In other words, liberal and conservative appointees did not differ in right 
to counsel cases, but counterintuitively, conservative-appointed judges modestly 
favoured the accused in search and seizure cases.41
Many fewer studies have been done of lower courts in Canada. James 
Stribopoulos and Moin A. Yahya surveyed decisions of the Court of Appeal for 
Ontario from 1990–2003 and found that conservative appointees were slightly 
more likely to rule conservatively in Charter criminal matters than liberal 
appointees.42 Analyzing the same data using different methods, Lori Hausegger, 
Troy Riddell, and Matthew Hennigar found that conservative appointees 
were less likely than liberal appointees to vote conservatively in these cases.43 
Neither group of researchers found a significant difference in non-Charter 
cases.44 Analyzing court of appeal decisions in Ontario, British Columbia, 
Saskatchewan, and Nova Scotia, Hausegger, Danielle McNabb, and Riddell 
cases between 1970-2003). See also Alarie & Green, “Should They All Just Get Along?” supra 
note 38 at 77-78.
40. Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 9 at 85-114, 215, Table 8.1.
41. For the years 1984-1994, the same researchers found a positive correlation between ideology 
and outcomes in search and seizure cases. In that study, however, they used a measure of 
ideology that combined party of appointment with an ideology score based on content 
analysis of pre-appointment newspaper articles about the judges. Matthew E Wetstein & 
CL Ostberg, “Search and Seizure Cases in the Supreme Court of Canada: Extending an 
American Model of Judicial Decision Making across Countries” (1999) 80 Soc Sci Q 757. 
In their more recent study referred to in the text immediately above, the researchers found 
that the newspaper-based metric correlated in the expected direction for both search and 
seizure and right to counsel cases. Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra 
note 9 at 214-15, Table 8.1. 
42. “Does a Judge’s Party of Appointment or Gender Matter to Case Outcomes?: An Empirical 
Study of the Court of Appeal for Ontario” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 315 at 354-55. 
43. Lori Hausegger, Troy Riddell & Matthew Hennigar, “Does Patronage Matter? Connecting 
Influences on Judicial Appointments with Judicial Decision Making” (2013) 46 Can J 
Political Science 665 at 681. They found, however, that judges with ties to the Liberal 
party (whether appointed by a Liberal or Progressive Conservative prime minister) voted 
more liberally in criminal cases than those with ties to the Progressive Conservatives. 
Ibid at 677-78.
44. Stribopoulos & Yayha, supra note 42 at 354-55; Hausegger, Riddell & Hennigar, supra 
note 43 at 681.
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found no significant divergence between liberal and conservative appointees in 
section 24(2) decisions.45
These findings do not mean that ideology plays no role in Canadian 
appellate decision making. Indeed, studies of voting patterns suggest (as most 
would expect) that many judges have distinct ideological profiles,46 though an 
individual judge’s profile is not always consistent either over time47 or across 
different legal domains.48 It is also possible that judges appointed by different 
governments with the same partisan affiliation might differ ideologically.49 It does 
mean, however, that party of appointment is generally a weak predictor of votes 
and case outcomes, including in criminal cases.
45. Supra note 4 at 17-18; Tables 3 & 4.
46. Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change,” supra note 37 at 34 (showing that many 
judges exhibit voting patterns substantially more or less conservative than the median); 
Songer, Transformation of the Supreme Court, supra note 38 at 185-93 (same); Ostberg & 
Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 9 at 60-68, 76 (Table 4.3); “Attitudinal 
Consistency in the Post-Charter Supreme Court” in ibid, 193 (finding that judges exhibited 
strong patterns of ideological voting in many domains, including criminal justice, and that 
these patterns often correlated strongly with ex ante ideology); CL Ostberg, Matthew E 
Wetstein & Craig R Ducat “Attitudinal Dimensions of Supreme Court Decision Making 
in Canada: The Lamer Court, 1991–1995” (2002) 55 Political Research Q 235 (same); 
C L Ostberg & Matthew Wetstein, “Dimensions of Attitudes Underlying Search and 
Seizure Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada” (1998) 31 Can J Political Science 
767 (evidence of ideological voting in search and seizure cases); Stribopoulos & Yahya, 
supra note 42 at 361-62 (patterns of ideological voting on Ontario Court of Appeal); Panu 
Sittiwong, Canadian Supreme Court Decision-making, 1875-1990: Institutional, Group, 
and Individual Level Perspectives (PhD Dissertation, University of North Texas, Department 
of Political Science, 1994) at 112-40, online (pdf ): <digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/
metadc278740/m2/1/high_res_d/1002721270-sittiwong.pdf> (showing substantial 
variations in voting behaviour between Court judges). See also generally S R Peck, “The 
Supreme Court of Canada, 1958-1966: A Search for Policy through Scalogram Analysis” 
(1967) 45 Can Bar Rev 666; Sidney R Peck, “A Scalogram Analysis of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, 1958–1967” in Glendon Schubert & David J Danelski, eds, Comparative Judicial 
Behavior: Cross-Cultural Studies of Political Decision-Making in the East and West (Oxford 
University Press, 1969) 293 at 297-324; Donald E Fouts, “Policy-Making in the Supreme 
Court of Canada, 1950-1960” at 270-87 in ibid, 257; Michael Bader & Edward Burstein, 
“The Supreme Court of Canada 1892-1902: A Study of the Men and the Times” (1970) 8 
Osgoode Hall LJ 503.
47. Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference Change,” supra note 37 at 39-41.
48. See Songer, Transformation of the Supreme Court, supra note 38 at 185-93; Ostberg & 
Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 9 at 206-09; Ostberg, Wetstein & Ducat, 
supra note 46.  
49. We made no attempt, for example, to distinguish between judges appointed during the 
tenure of different Liberal (or Conservative) prime ministers.
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Examinations of the effect of gender and other background factors on judicial 
decision making in Canada have produced mixed results. Donald R. Songer 
found that female Supreme Court justices were more likely to vote conservatively 
in criminal cases,50 whereas Ostberg and Wetstein found no correlation between 
judges’ gender and case outcomes in the criminal realm.51 
Stribopoulos and Yahya found that male judges of the Court of Appeal for 
Ontario were more likely to overturn a Charter-based acquittal than their female 
counterparts.52 Looking at the same data, Hausegger, Riddell, and Hennigar 
found that female judges voted more liberally in non-Charter (but not Charter) 
criminal cases than male judges.53 In examining provincial appellate decisions 
from five provinces from 1982–2008, Songer, Miroslava Radieva, and Rebecca 
Reid found that female judges were modestly more likely to vote conservatively 
than males in criminal cases.54 Hausegger, McNabb, and Riddell’s examination 
of section 24(2) decisions from four provincial appellate courts, however, found 
no significant difference between male and female judges.55
Two previous studies examined the effect of professional background on 
case outcomes in Canada. Hausegger, Riddell, and Hennigar found that between 
50. Songer, Transformation of the Supreme Court, supra note 38 at 206. In contrast, they were 
substantially more likely to vote liberally in civil liberties and economic cases (ibid). See also 
Johnson, Songer & Jilani, supra note 38 at 249 (female Supreme Court judges voted more 
conservatively than males in criminal cases from 1982-2007); Susan W Johnson & Donald 
Songer, “Judge Gender and the Voting Behavior of Justices on Two North American Supreme 
Courts” (2009) 30 Justice System J 265 at 272-74; Jilani, Songer & Johnson, supra note 39 
at 66 (female Supreme Court judges from 1976-2007 voted slightly more conservatively in 
criminal Charter cases). 
51. Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 9 at 75. See also Songer & Johnson, supra note 
38 at 928-29, Table 3 (female-liberalism correlation in civil liberties, but not criminal or 
economic cases; no significant correlation between gender and liberalism in Supreme Court 
criminal cases from 1978-2000). See also Candace C White, “Gender Differences on the 
Supreme Court” in FL Morton, ed, Law, Politics and the Judicial Process in Canada, 3rd ed 
(University of Calgary Press, 2002) 85 (female-liberalism correlation in civil liberties and 
equality cases but not legal rights claims).
52. Supra note 42 at 356. In domestic and sexual violence cases, however, women voted more 
conservatively than men (ibid at 356, 358). Stribopoulos and Yahya also examined the 
interaction of appointing party and gender, concluding that the latter has more explanatory 
power than the former (ibid at 353, 358). But see Peter McCormick & Twyla Job, “Do 
Women Judges Make a Difference? An Analysis of Appeal Court Data” (1993) 8 CJLS 135 
(no significant difference between male and female judges in criminal appeals in Alberta).
53. Supra note 43 at 680, 682. 
54. “Gender Diversity in the Intermediate Appellate Courts of Canada” (2016) 37 Justice System 
J 4 at 12, Table 1.
55. Supra note 4 at 17-18 and Tables 3 and 4.
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1990–2003, former defence lawyers on the Court of Appeal for Ontario voted 
more liberally in Charter (but not non-Charter) criminal cases than the average 
judge.56 Former prosecutors (of whom there were few in the dataset) did not 
vote differently in criminal cases than other judges.57 Hausegger, McNabb, and 
Riddell found no difference between former prosecutors and defence lawyers in 
section 24(2) cases from four provincial courts of appeal.58
Another possible external influence on judges’ section 24(2) decisions 
is location-specific legal culture. Conformity bias may induce judges in some 
jurisdictions or courts to be more inclined to exclude unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence than in other jurisdictions or courts. There has been little study of this 
question in Canada. Songer, Radieva, and Reid found that provincial appellate 
judges in British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario voted more conservatively in 
criminal cases than in New Brunswick.59 And using Court of Appeal for Ontario 
judges as a reference point, Hausegger, McNabb, and Ridell found that British 
Columbia appellate judges were more likely to admit and Saskatchewan and 
Nova Scotia judges more likely to exclude.60
B. JURISPRUDENCE 
The scholarship reviewed above suggests that extra-legal influences on section 
24(2) decisions may be limited. In other words, case-specific legalist factors likely 
play an important, if not dominant, role in deciding whether unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence is excluded. We therefore mined our dataset to tease out the 
internal legal correlates of exclusion. To put our findings in context, it is first 
necessary to summarize the section 24(2) jurisprudence.
Before the Charter, courts in Canada had no general power to exclude illegally 
obtained evidence.61 After its passage in 1982, courts were required to adjudicate 
claims of police62 violations of fundamental, constitutionally entrenched 
56. Supra note 43 at 683.
57. Ibid at 683-84.
58. Supra note 4 at 18 and Tables 3 and 4. They did find, however, that judges with both 
backgrounds were more likely to exclude (ibid).
59. Supra note 54 at 13, Table 2.
60. Supra note 4 at 17 and Tables 3 and 4.
61. See generally A Anne McLellan & Bruce P Elman, “The Enforcement of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: An Analysis of Section 24” (1983) 21 Alta L Rev 
205 at 225-30.  
62. We use “police” throughout this article as shorthand for any state actor, i.e., a person or 
entity governed by the Charter as defined in section 32 of that enactment. See generally 
Patrick J Monahan, Byron Shaw & Padraic Ryan, Constitutional Law, 5th ed (Irwin Law, 
2017) at 427-34. 
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procedural norms.63 If claimants establish a violation of one of their own Charter 
rights, they may apply for exclusion under section 24(2).64 Under the language 
of the provision, claimants must prove that: (1) the evidence was “obtained in 
a manner” that violated the Charter; and (2) admission of the evidence would 
“bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”65 
Very briefly, to satisfy the “obtained in a manner” requirement, the claimant 
must show either a sufficiently strong causal connection between the violation 
and the acquisition of the evidence or that the two events occurred as part of the 
“same transaction or course of conduct.”66 As we will see, this requirement plays 
only a minimal role in section 24(2) trial decisions. 
The “disrepute” requirement is far more consequential. Early on, the 
Supreme Court signaled (to the surprise of many) that exclusion would not be 
an extraordinary remedy reserved only for egregious misconduct, but rather one 
that would be appropriate at least in cases when the violation was characterized 
as “flagrant.”67 In its 1987 decision in R v Collins (“Collins”), the Court 
confirmed that section 24(2) represented an “intermediate” position between the 
(Canadian) common law’s rejection of illegality as a basis for exclusion and what 
it characterized as the “American rule” of automatic exclusion.68 The exclusionary 
63. See Charter, supra note 1 (right to be “secure against unreasonable search or seizure,” s 8; 
right “not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned,” s 9; right on arrest or detention “to 
be informed promptly of the reasons therefor,” s 10(a); and right on arrest or detention to 
“retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right,” s 10(b)). 
64. Ibid, s 24(2). In rare circumstances exclusion may also be ordered under section 24(1) of 
the Charter, which empowers courts to issue any remedy that is “appropriate and just in 
the circumstances” (ibid, s (24(1)). This is possible, however, only if the evidence was not 
“obtained in a manner” that violated the Charter, for example, when it is the admission of 
the evidence at trial that violates the Charter and not the police misconduct associated with 
the acquisition of the evidence (ibid, s 24(2)). When the violation is sufficiently connected to 
the obtaining of the evidence (in the manner discussed in the text below), the only route to 
exclusion is section 24(2). See R v Bjelland, 2009 SCC 38 at paras 3, 19. This study focuses 
exclusively on exclusion under s 24(2).
65. Charter, supra note 1, s 24(2).
66. R v Wittwer, 2008 SCC 33 at para 21. See also R v Goldhart, [1996] 2 SCR 463 
at paras 32-40.
67. See Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 6th ed (Carswell, 2014) at 
636-38. Given the pre-Charter jurisprudence and legislative history of section 24(2), many 
expected that the exclusion of evidence would be reserved only for conduct that “shocks the 
community.” See McLellan & Elman, supra note 61 at 243-45; Rothman v R, [1981] 1 SCR 
640 at 696-97 (Lamer J).
68. R v Collins, [1987] 1 SCR 265 at 280 [Collins].
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decision, it stressed, should be made objectively, in light of “long term community 
values” and with deference to the trial judge’s decision on appeal.69 
Writing for the majority, Justice Lamer grouped the case-specific factors 
relevant to gauging disrepute into three categories: (1) those affecting the “fairness 
of the trial”; (2) those bearing on the “seriousness of the violation”; and (3) those 
bearing on exclusion’s effect on the repute of the justice system, including the 
importance of the evidence and the seriousness of the offence.70 The fairness of 
the trial would be compromised, he asserted, by admitting a confession or other 
self-incriminating evidence, including bodily samples taken to gauge alcohol 
concentrations for those charged with impaired driving offences.71 Subject to a 
consideration of the other factors, such evidence “generally should be excluded.”72 
Collins was refined and consolidated a decade later in R v Stillman 
(“Stillman”).73 There, the Court confirmed that evidence affecting trial fairness 
is subject to a strong exclusionary presumption.74 Such evidence was defined as 
evidence that is both “conscriptive” (statements of the accused, compelled bodily 
evidence, and physical evidence derived therefrom) and non-discoverable (not 
obtainable by legal means).75 As in Collins, the fate of evidence not affecting 
trial fairness was to be determined by balancing the seriousness of the violation 
(on the one hand) against the seriousness of the offence and importance of the 
evidence to the prosecution (on the other).76
69. Ibid at 281-83.
70. Ibid at 284-85.
71. Ibid at 284.
72. Ibid at 284-85.
73. [1997] 1 SCR 607 [Stillman].
74. Ibid at para 72. See also R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at para 64 [Grant] (noting that courts 
had generally interpreted Stillman “as creating an all-but-automatic exclusionary rule for 
non-discoverable conscriptive evidence”).
75. Stillman, supra note 73 at paras 80-119.
76. See David M Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 7th ed (Irwin Law, 
2015) at 405-06.
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The Collins/Stillman framework was subject to withering academic77 
(and even judicial)78 criticism and in 2009 the Court changed course. In R v 
Grant (“Grant”) it jettisoned the “trial fairness” category and instructed judges 
to consider and balance the following categories of factors: (1) “the seriousness 
of the Charter-infringing state conduct”; (2) “the impact of the breach on the 
Charter-protected interests of the accused”; and (3) “society’s interest in the 
adjudication of the case on its merits.”79
Under the first category, the court’s task is to gauge the state’s culpability 
along a spectrum ranging from inadvertent, reasonable errors to deliberate 
wrongdoing.80 In recent years, the Court has consistently characterized inadvertent 
but negligent errors as serious, thus militating in favour of excluding evidence.81 
Reasonable mistakes made under conditions of legal uncertainty, in contrast, are 
viewed as less serious and favour admitting evidence.82 
The second factor is measured by gauging the extent to which the violation 
infringed on protected interests, such as privacy for section 8 claims or liberty 
under section 9.83 Proving that the evidence would have been legally discovered 
77. See e.g. David M Paciocco, “The Judicial Repeal of s. 24(2) and the Development of the 
Canadian Exclusionary Rule” (1990) 32 Crim LQ 326 at 338-39; David M Paciocco, 
“Stillman, Disproportion and the Fair Trial Dichotomy under Section 24(2)” (1997) 2 Can 
Crim L Rev 163; Richard Mahoney, “Problems with the Current Approach to s. 24(2) of 
the Charter: An Inevitable Discovery” (1999) 42 Crim LQ 443; Don Stuart, Charter Justice 
in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed (Thomson Carswell, 2005) at 566-76, 578-82; Steven 
Penney, “Taking Deterrence Seriously: Excluding Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence 
Under Section 24(2) of the Charter” (2004) 49 McGill LJ 105 at 129-33.
78. See e.g. R v Grant (2006), 81 OR (3d) 1 at paras 47, 49-50 (Ont CA), rev’d in part 2009 
SCC 32. This decision was reversed on other grounds in 2009. See Grant, supra note 74; 
R v Dolynchuk (E.N.), 2004 MBCA 45 at paras 47-48; R v Richfield (2003), 178 CCC (3d) 
23 at para 18 (Ont CA); R v Janzen, 2006 SKCA 111 at para 7; R v Lotozky, (2006) 81 OR 
(3d) 335 at para 44 (Ont CA). See also R v Orbanski; R v Elias [2005] 2 SCR 37 at paras 
87, 92-93 (LeBel J, dissenting in Elias).
79. Grant, supra note 74 at para 71. 
80. Ibid at paras 72-74. See also Steven Penney, Vincenzo Rondinelli & James Stribopoulos, 
Criminal Procedure in Canada, 2nd ed (LexisNexis, 2018) at ss 10.107-119.
81. See e.g. Harrison, supra note 2 at para 22; R v Morelli, 2010 SCC 8 at paras 100-103 
[Morelli]; R v Le, 2019 SCC 34 at para 147 [Le].
82. See e.g. R v Cole, 2012 SCC 53 at para 86 [Cole]; R v Aucoin, 2012 SCC 66 at para 50 
[Aucoin]; R v Fearon, 2014 SCC 77 at paras 92-94 [Fearon]; R v Vu, 2013 SCC 60 at paras 
69-71; Grant, supra note 74 at paras 133, 140.
83. Grant, supra note 74 at paras 78, 109, 113-14; Le, supra note 80 at paras 153-54.
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without the violation, however, may diminish its effect on the relevant interest 
and weigh in favour of admission.84 
Under the third factor, courts consider the evidence’s reliability and 
importance to the prosecution’s case as well as the seriousness of the offence.85 
Reliable and important evidence is more likely to be admitted (and vice versa).86 
Offence seriousness, however, may “cut both ways.”87 “[W]hile the public has a 
heightened interest in seeing a determination on the merits where the offence 
charged is serious,” the Court asserted, “it also has a vital interest in having a 
justice system that is above reproach, particularly where the penal stakes for 
the accused are high.”88 As it had in Collins,89 the Court in Grant stressed that 
the purpose of excluding evidence is to dissociate the courts from unacceptable 
state misconduct and maintain long-term public confidence in the criminal 
justice system.90
84. Ibid at para 122. See also R v Nolet, 2010 SCC 24 at para 54; R v Côté, 2011 SCC 46 
at paras 72, 84 [Côté] (the fact that police had probable grounds to search attenuated the 
impact of the violation caused by failure to obtain a warrant); Cole, supra note 82 at para 93 
(same); Fearon, supra note 82 at para 96 (same).
85. Grant, supra note 74 at paras 80-83. Note that the reliability criterion relates only to 
reliability concerns arising from Charter violations (e.g., when an accused confesses without 
having been properly afforded the right to counsel). See Fearon, supra note 82 at para 194 
(Karakatsanis J dissenting). 
86. Grant, supra note 74 at paras 81-83.
87. Ibid at para 84.
88. Ibid. The Court’s treatment of offence seriousness post-Grant is difficult to characterize. 
In some cases, it has either ignored the factor or characterized its net effect as being roughly 
neutral. See Morelli, supra note 81 at para 107; Côté, supra note 84 at paras 47-48, 53-56; 
Aucoin, supra note 82 at para 51; Cole, supra note 82 at para 96; Fearon, supra note 82 
at para 97; R v Taylor, 2014 SCC 50 at para 37; R v MacKenzie, 2013 SCC 50 at paras 
134-35. In others, it has seemingly counted an offence’s relative seriousness as weighing 
(at least somewhat) in favour of admission. See R v Spencer, 2014 SCC 43 at paras 79-80 
(“Society undoubtedly has an interest in seeing a full and fair trial based on reliable evidence, 
and all the more so for a crime which implicates the safety of children” at para 80); R v Mian, 
2014 SCC 54 at para 88 [Mian] (noting uncritically that the trial judge considered offence 
seriousness as favouring admission); Harrison, supra note 2 at paras 34-35 (noting that 
while offence seriousness “must not take on disproportionate significance,” the “very serious 
charge…weighs in favour of admission” at paras 34-35).
89. Supra note 68 at 281 (the purpose of excluding evidence is to prevent further disrepute 
occasioned by “admission of evidence that would deprive the accused of a fair hearing, 
or from judicial condonation of unacceptable conduct by the investigatory and 
prosecutorial agencies”).
90. Supra note 74 at paras 68-72. See also Le, supra note 81 at para 140; Morelli, supra note 
81 at para 108.
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While the Court stressed in Grant that the three factors must be balanced 
without the benefit of any “overarching rule,”91 some general guidelines have 
emerged. First, the Court in Grant pronounced a “presumptive” but “not 
automatic” rule that statements obtained from the accused through a Charter 
violation should be excluded.92 The Court reasoned that Charter breaches 
producing statements are often serious; the self-incrimination interests harmed 
by such violations are particularly “fundamental,” and improper questioning 
often results in unreliable confessions.93 Unconstitutionally obtained statements 
could be admitted, however, when these generalizations did not apply.94 
The Court stressed, however, that compelled bodily samples are not subject 
to the same exclusionary presumption.95 Indeed, it hinted that breath samples 
collected in impaired driving investigations would often be admitted because 
“the method of collection is relatively non-intrusive.”96 In the years since Grant, 
however, many lower courts have attempted to qualify this dictum, noting that 
the Charter violations arising in impaired driving cases often involve significant 
intrusions on liberty.97 
Lastly, the Court has recently stated that excluding evidence may be 
warranted even where only one of the three factors pulls in that direction.98 
It is possible, the Court stated in R v Le, “that serious Charter-infringing conduct, 
even when coupled with a weak impact on the Charter-protected interest, will on 
its own support a finding that admission of tainted evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.”99 And where both of the first two 
categories strongly favour exclusion of evidence, “the third inquiry will seldom 
91. Grant, supra note 73 at para 86. See also Harrison, supra note 2 at para 36 (the Grant test 
is “qualitative” and “not capable of mathematical precision”); Mian, supra note 87 at para 
88 (characterizing the Grant test as “flexible and imprecise balancing exercise”); Côté, supra 
note 83 at para 48 (“No one consideration should be permitted to consistently trump other 
considerations”).
92. Supra note 73 at para 92. 
93. Ibid at paras 93-98.
94. Ibid at para 96.
95. Ibid at paras 99-111.
96. Ibid at para 111.
97. See e.g. R v Bagherli (A), 2014 MBCA 105 at paras 76-79; R v Spin, 2014 NSCA 1 at paras 
60-79; R v Cullen, 2015 SKCA 142 at paras 53-55. See also Don Stuart, Charter Justice 
in Canadian Criminal Law, 6th ed (Carswell, 2014) at 664-65. But see R v Jennings, 2018 
ONCA 260 at paras 27-29 (stressing minimal intrusiveness of the breath sampling process as 
limiting the impact of a section 8 breach on the accused’s Charter-protected interests).
98. Le, supra note 81 at para 141.
99. Ibid [emphasis in original].
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if ever tip the balance in favour of admissibility.”100 Conversely, “if the first two 
inquiries together reveal weaker support for exclusion of the evidence, the third 
inquiry will most often confirm that the administration of justice would not be 
brought into disrepute by admitting the evidence.”101
II. DATA & METHODS
To gauge the influence of both the legal and extra-legal variables on section 24(2) 
decisions, we compiled an original dataset of all trial decisions (provincial and 
superior trial court) obtained from the Canadian Legal Information Institute 
(CANLII) database decided between 1 January 2013–31 December 2018.102 
We excluded cases in which judges either did not find a Charter violation or 
found that the evidence sought to be excluded was not “obtained in a manner” 
that infringed the Charter.103 
The details of our coding procedure may be found online.104 The key external 
variables were the judge’s gender, party of appointment, professional background, 
court level, and provincial and territorial jurisdiction. The key internal variables 
were the accused’s gender along with the suite of factors identified in Grant as 
guiding the exclusionary decision. To test for changes wrought by that decision, 
we also compiled a sample of cases from 2007, two years before Grant.
100. Ibid at para 142. See also R v Paterson, 2017 SCC 15 at para 56 [Paterson]; R v McGuffie, 
2016 ONCA 365 at para 62-63; Stevens c R, 2016 QCCA 1707 at paras 89-90.
101. Le, supra note 81 at para 142.
102. The dataset is available online. See “Penney & Yahya 24(2) Datasets,” online: <bit.
ly/2BPF5wF>; for the details of our coding procedure, see “Codebook” (2020), online: <bit.
ly/2EIprEr> [“Codebook”]. Additionally, see generally Mark A Hall & Ronald F Wright, 
“Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions” (2008) 96 Cal L Rev 63 at 100-16.
103. In many of these cases, judges went on to conduct a full section 24(2) inquiry for the 
purposes of potential appellate review. In none of these cases did the judge conclude that, 
had there been a violation, the evidence would have been excluded. This suggests that the 
practice of conducting an “in the alternative” section 24(2) assessment serves no purpose and 
that no appellate deference should be given to trial judges’ exclusionary assessments when 
they did not find that evidence was obtained in a manner that violated the Charter. See Le, 
supra note 81 at para 138; Paterson, supra note 100 at para 42.
104. See “Codebook,” supra note 101. 
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III. FINDINGS
A. DATASET CHARACTERISTICS
Our main dataset (2013–2018) contains 1,472 observations.105 The breakdown 
of the cases by level of court can be seen in Table 1 below.
TABLE 1: NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY COURT LEVEL




As seen in Table 2, below, most of the observations came from Alberta, British 
Columbia, Saskatchewan, Quebec, and Ontario. Ontario decisions comprised 
almost half (46%) of all observations.












105. The number of reported “exclusionary decisions” in our dataset (1,472) is greater than 
the number of reported cases, i.e., decisions with unique citations (1,327). As explained 
in greater detail in the “Codebook,” supra note 102, we coded judges as making multiple 
exclusionary decisions in a single case if they either: (1) considered the admissibility of both a 
statement of the accused and any other kind of evidence; or (2) for non-statement evidence, 
dealt with more than one type of evidence and treated them differently in the Grant analysis. 
All statistical analyses are based on “exclusionary decisions.”
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In terms of judicial characteristics, one quarter of cases were adjudicated by 
female judges.106 Former prosecutors decided 27% of the cases, 30% were 
decided by former criminal defence counsel, and the remainder were decided by 
judges with non-criminal practice backgrounds.107 Forty-one percent of the cases 
were decided by judges appointed by conservative governments, 43% by liberal 
governments, and 16% by social democratic governments.108 This can all be seen 
in Table 3, below.










Social Democrat 230 15.7
Total 1,470109 100
106. Note that there is greater gender balance in the superior courts (30% of judges being 
female) than provincial courts (23%). Overall, the percentage of female judges increased 
(non-linearly) between 2013 (20%) and 2018 (26%).
107. In the provincial courts, 28% of judges were former prosecutors, 38% were former defence 
counsel, and 33% were non-criminal lawyers. In the superior courts, 24% were former 
Crown counsel, 18% were former defence counsel, and 58% were non-criminal lawyers. 
108. Our partisan-political classification methodology is described in detail in the “Codebook,” 
supra note 102. The number of liberal appointees increased over time (from 34% in 2013 to 
57% in 2018) while the number of conservative (47% to 35%) and social democratic (19% 
to 7%) appointees decreased.
109. In two instances, we were not able to determine the judge’s party of appointment.
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All superior courts judges were appointed by either conservative or liberal 
governments. Sixty-three percent of superior court decisions were made by 
conservative-appointed judges, with the remaining 37% by liberal appointees. The 
party of appointment proportions for provincial court were 28% conservative, 
47% liberal, and 25% social democratic. The distribution of judges by party of 
appointment across the two court levels is shown in Table 4, below.
TABLE 4: JUDGES’ PARTY OF APPOINTMENT BY LEVEL OF COURT. PERCENT IS 
EQUAL TO THE PROPORTION OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF JUDGES FROM EACH 
POLITICAL PARTY CATEGORY IN EACH COURT LEVEL
Court Conservative Liberal N/A Social Democrat Total
Provincial Number 260 438 8 230 936
Percent 43.6 69.0 88.9 100 63.7
Superior Number 336 197 1 0 534
Percent 56.4 31.0 11.1 0 36.3
Total 596 635 9 230 1,470
B. OVERALL EXCLUSION RATE
The exclusion rate in our dataset was 70.4%; that is, in 1,472 reported 
exclusionary decisions from 2013–2018, trial judges who found that evidence 
was obtained in a manner that violated the Charter excluded at least some of 
the evidence in just over seven in ten instances. This figure is broadly consistent 
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with the exclusion rate found in other studies.110 As illustrated in Table 5 below, 
the exclusion rate was highest in 2014 (73.52%) and lowest in 2017 (68.37%). 
While no clear secular trend emerged from this period, in no year was the rate 
as high as that found in our sample of 2007 trial decisions (75%). While this 
offers some support for the hypothesis that the Court’s 2009 decision in Grant 
modestly diminished the frequency of excluding evidence, the difference between 
the mean 2013–2018 rate and the 2007 rate is not statistically significant.111 
TABLE 5: NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF EXCLUSIONS BY YEAR
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total
Number 144 161 159 178 227 167 1,036
Percent 72.7 73.5 68.2 72.4 68.4 68.4 70.4
Like the datasets in other studies, our dataset includes only “reported” 
or “published” decisions, i.e., those available on online databases.112 More than 
110. See Madden, “Marshalling,” supra note 3, Table 1 (70% exclusion rate for 100 cases reported 
in English in 2010, including some appeal decisions); Nadon, supra note 3 (69% exclusion 
rate for 45 Quebec trial decisions from 2009-2011); Asselin, “Trends,” supra note 3, Table 
1(a) (73% exclusion rate for 98 trial decisions in 2012), Table 8 (67% exclusion rate for 
1,236 trial decisions from 2009-2014); Johnson, Jochelson & Weir, supra note 3, Table 2 
(75% exclusion rate for 600 trial decisions from 2014-2017); Patrick McGuinty, “Section 
24(2) of the Charter; Exploring the Role of Police Conduct in the Grant Analysis” (2018) 
41 Man LJ 273 at 288 (67% exclusion rate for 100 cases from 2016, including some appeal 
decisions). Madden generously shared his dataset with us. We adapted it for our purposes by 
deleting appeal decisions and including every reported case (in English or French) from 2010 
that we could find that was not initially included. For this adjusted dataset, the exclusion 
rate was 68% (76 out of 111). We also deleted the appeal decisions and decisions where no 
breach was found from the 2016 McGuinty dataset, finding an adjusted exclusion rate of 
71% (52 out of 73).
111. The t-statistic is 1.15, which is not significant at a level of 5% or 10%. See also Hausegger, 
McNabb & Riddell, supra note 4 at 14-16 and Table 4 (noting significant decline in 
post-Grant exclusion rate in court of appeal decisions from four provinces).
112. Trial judges are generally thought to publish when they think that their reasons would have 
significant precedential or jurisprudential value. See Denise M Keele et al, “An Analysis 
of Ideological Effects in Published Versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions” (2009) 6 J 
Empirical Leg Stud 213 at 214; Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J Schwab, “What Shapes 
Perceptions of the Federal Court System?” (1989) 56 U Chicago L Rev 501 at 535; Peter 
Siegelman & John J Donohue III, “Studying the Iceberg from its Tip: A Comparison of 
Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases” (1990) 24 Law & Soc’y 
Rev 1133 at 1149-50. Decisions to publish may be influenced by other factors, however, 
such as individual judges’ preferences for writing, willingness to work, desire for promotion, 
and other idiosyncratic factors. See Karen Swenson, “Federal District Court Judges and the 
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half113 of section 24(2) trial decisions are not reported and there is (to our 
knowledge) no efficient means of collecting (or even scientifically sampling) these 
decisions. As a result, we cannot state that our findings are representative of all 
trial decisions.114
Though this is a substantial caveat, it is far from fatal. First, inasmuch as 
our analyses reveal meaningful patterns in ways that section 24(2) is applied in 
reported decisions, our understanding of the jurisprudence is enhanced beyond 
what would be achievable through traditional, ad hoc appellate case analysis.115 
To the extent that judges are influenced by other judges’ decisions, that influence 
comes predominantly from reported reasons. 
Second, it is possible to get at least some sense of the extent to which reported 
section 24(2) cases are representative of all such cases.116 We collected all reported 
appeal decisions for 2013 and 2018 where a trial judge’s section 24(2) decision 
was challenged on appeal (n=133).117 Assuming that reported and unreported 
trial decisions are appealed with the same frequency and distribution,118 we can 
test for differences between the two types of cases.
Decision to Publish” (2004) 25 Justice System J 121 at 123-28. In addition, courts may have 
differing practices and norms associated with publication. See Siegelman & Donohue, supra 
note 112 at 1144.
113. We explain how we estimated this proportion below.
114. See generally Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 112; Keele et al, supra note 112; Eisenberg 
& Schwab, supra note 112 at 535.
115. See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 112 at 1136, n 9.
116. For similar methodologies, see Donald R Songer, “Nonpublication in the United States 
District Courts: Official Criteria Versus Inferences from Appellate Review” (1988) 50 J 
Politics 206 at 208; Swenson, supra note 112 at 129-31. 
117. This includes appeals of both summary conviction offences (heard by a judge of the 
provincial superior trial court) and indictable offences (heard by a panel of the court of 
appeal). The vast majority of appeal decisions involving section 24(2) of the Charter are 
themselves reported, so there is negligible risk of selection bias for these cases. To confirm 
this assumption, we first examined all Supreme Court of Canada decisions from 2013–2018 
where a section 24(2) determination was made at some point in the proceedings (n=20). 
In every case, the decision from the court of appeal below was reported. We also collected 
all court of appeal decisions constituting appeals of summary conviction appeal dispositions 
from the same period and found that 23 of 25 (92%) of the decisions below (i.e., the initial 
summary conviction appeal) were reported. 
118. This assumption is not unassailable as the decision to appeal is made by the parties, not 
by researchers selecting a representative random sample. See Keele et al, supra note 112 at 
221; Swenson, supra note 112 at 129. We cannot think of reasons for any major systemic 
differences, however, between reported and unreported cases in relation to the decision 
to appeal trial judges’ section 24(2) rulings. See generally ibid at 130 (finding only minor 
differences between appealed and un-appealed US district court decisions).       
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Of the reported trial decisions appealed (n=58, 44% of cases), the exclusion 
rate was 55% at trial; for unreported cases (n=75, 56% of cases), it was 41%. 
Both rates are substantially lower than the rate for all reported trial decisions 
in our sample (70%). This is to be expected, since defendants are much more 
likely to appeal the admission of evidence than the prosecution is to appeal 
its exclusion.119 The difference between the exclusion rates for reported and 
unreported cases appealed tells us, however, that a judge who excludes evidence 
is more likely to publish reasons for the decision than a judge who admits.120 
This could be because exclusion induces writing, because judges who write 
more are more exclusionary, or a combination of these factors. This finding is 
consistent with previous research which shows that when there are ideological 
differences between published and un-published decisions, the former is more 
liberal than the latter.121 
In any case, the data suggest that that actual exclusion rate (for reported and 
unreported cases together) is closer to 60% than the 70.4% rate for reported 
decisions. While this difference is substantial,122 it is not huge. While it does signal 
a need for caution in extrapolating from reported to all decisions, it does not 
suggest that findings from the former are wholly unrepresentative of the latter.123 
119. See generally Cross, supra note 9 at 134-35.
120. The difference between the two means is statistically insignificant at the 10% level, possibly 
due to the small sample size. We note that at the 12% level of significance, the difference 
would have been significant. 
121. See CK Rowland & Robert A Carp, Politics and Judgment in Federal District Courts 
(University Press of Kansas, 1996) at 126-27 (criminal cases in federal district courts in three 
cities); Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 112 at 1155-56 (federal courts in employment 
discrimination cases); Keith Carlson, Michael A Livermore & Daniel N Rockmore, “The 
Problem of Data Bias in the Pool of Published U.S. Appellate Court Opinions” (2020) 17 
J Empirical Leg Stud 224 (computational modeling of various publication effects in federal 
circuit courts). 
122. We derived this estimate by using the number of cases in the appeal sample to infer the 
number of unreported trial judgments that would exist to match what we collected. Given 
that there were seventy-five unreported trial decisions and fifty-eight reported, we infer 
that there would be 1472 x (75/58) = 1903 corresponding unreported cases in our sample. 
Given that the relative exclusion rate in the appellate sample was 41%/55% = 74.5%, this 
implies that the exclusion rate for the 1,903 unreported cases would be 74.5% x 70.4% 
= 52.4%. As such, the total exclusion rate will be (70.4% x 1472 + 52.4% x 1903)/
(1472+1903) = 60.3%. 
123. See Keele et al, supra note 112 at 230, 233 (no ideological differences between published and 
unpublished decisions in federal district courts).
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C. EXTERNAL VARIABLES
1. SUPERIOR VERSUS PROVINCIAL COURTS
As seen in Table 6, below, provincial court judges were more likely to exclude 
evidence (74%) than superior court judges (65%).124 The difference is 
statistically significant.125




This difference in exclusion rates could be explained either by differences between 
the judges appointed to the two levels of court or differences between the types 
of cases that they hear. We examine the question of judicial characteristics in this 
section and case characteristics in the next.
2. JUDGES’ GENDER
Table 7, below, shows that gender differences were small and statistically 
insignificant, both overall and within each court level.126 






























124. See also Johnson, Jochelson & Weir, supra note 3, Table 15 (reporting a higher exclusion 
rate at trial for provincial courts, 74%, than superior courts, 62%); Jochelson, Huang & 
Murchison, supra note 3, Table 8 (reporting a 70% exclusion rate for provincial trial courts; 
62% for superior trial courts). 
125. The t-statistic is -3.67, which is significant at the 5% level.
126. The t-statistic for provincial courts is 0.07; for superior courts, it is 0.19; for both combined 
it is 0.2. None of these results is significant at a level of 5% or 10%.
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3. PARTY OF APPOINTMENT
The exclusion rates for ideology (as measured by party of appointment) are 
depicted in Table 8. The combined exclusion rates for both levels of court are 
69.8% for liberal appointees, 68.3% for conservative appointees, and 77.0% for 
social democratic appointees. The difference between conservative and liberal 
appointees is very small and statistically insignificant.127 The social democratic 
exclusion rate, however, is significantly higher.128 
TABLE 8: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION AND ADMISSION BY LEVEL OF 






























































In addition to the three-way comparison discussed immediately above, 
we also conducted a two-way comparison, classifying each judge as either 
127. The t-statistic for the difference between conservative and liberal exclusion rates in all courts 
was 0.57, which was statistically insignificant at the 5% and 10% levels. For the difference 
between liberals and conservatives on the superior courts, the t-statistic was 0.3, and for the 
differences between liberals and conservatives on the provincial courts, the t-statistic was 
0.02. Both are also statistically insignificant at the 5% and 10% levels. 
128. The t-statistic for social democratic judges versus liberal and conservative judges combined is 
2.42; for social democratic judges versus liberal judges, it is 2.05; for social democratic judges 
versus conservative judges, it is 2.45. Each result is significant at the 5% level.
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“liberal” or “conservative.”129 This did not yield any significant differences in 
exclusion rates.130
4. JUDGES’ PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND 
Another possible source of difference is the judges’ pre-appointment background. 
Table 9, below, displays the exclusion rates by court level and professional 
background. For both levels of court combined, former criminal defence lawyers 
excluded evidence 76% of the time, Crown prosecutors 64%, and non-criminal 
lawyers 71%. Each of these differences is statistically significant.131 




















































As shown in Table 10, below, we also found substantial differences between 
jurisdictions. The exclusion rate was higher than the national average in Quebec 
129. For this comparison we classified a judge as “liberal” if his or her party of appointment was 
situated to the ideological left of the contemporary opposition party, and vice-versa. This is 
explained in further detail in the “Codebook,” supra note 102.
130. In the provincial courts, the exclusion rate for conservative judges was 73.3%; for liberal 
judges, it was 73.6%, a statistically insignificant difference (t-statistic of 0.09). In the superior 
courts, the exclusion rate was 64.0% for liberal appointees and 65.1% for conservative ones, 
which is also a statistically insignificant difference (t-statistic of 0.30). 
131. The t-statistic for defence versus Crown is 3.84 (significant at 5%); for non-criminal 
versus Crown, it is 2.25 (significant at 5%); for non-criminal versus defence, it is 1.93 
(significant at 10%).
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and British Columbia and substantially lower in Alberta.132 Of the remaining 
jurisdictions with more than 100 cases each, Ontario showed a modestly higher 
admission rate and Saskatchewan a modestly lower one. Rates for the remaining 
provinces are reported in Table 11, below.
TABLE 10: EXCLUSION RATE BY PROVINCES (WITH >100 OBSERVATIONS)
AB BC ON QC SK
Number 165 128 678 256 108
Rate 63.6 73.4 67.6 77.0 71.3
TABLE 11: EXCLUSION RATE BY PROVINCES (WITH <100 OBSERVATIONS)
MB NB NL NS NT NU PEI YT
Rate 33 10 36 31 8 3 1 15
Number 69.7 40.0 83.3 87.1 100 33.3 100 73.3
6. PAIRWISE DIFFERENCES 
A note at this point is warranted regarding how to interpret our results. One 
way to interpret them is to think of them as conditional rates, which means 
that a given exclusion rate is a function of what information we possess. For 
example, knowing a judge’s gender would not enhance our ability to predict 
whether unconstitutionally obtained evidence would be excluded. Nor would 
knowing that the judge was a conservative or liberal appointee. So far, the 
variables that appear predictive are court level, professional background, and 
jurisdiction. As we proceed, we will condition the odds of exclusion on more 
than two variables, such as whether the judge is a male who was a prosecutor 
prior to his appointment who now sits on a superior court.
Consider first the combination of court level and party of appointment. 
We know that the exclusion rate is higher for both social democratic appointees 
(compared to liberals and conservatives) and provincial court judges (compared to 
superior court judges). However, we also know that social democrats are present 
132. Among these five provinces, pairwise tests of differences are significant at the 5% level for 
BC versus Alberta, Quebec versus Alberta, and Quebec versus Ontario. See also Johnson, 
Jochelson & Weir, supra note 3, Table 3 (substantially lower than average exclusion rate for 
Alberta; substantially higher rates for British Columbia and Quebec).
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only on the provincial courts. Could this help explain the higher exclusion rate 
in provincial court? 
The answer appears to be no. While social democratic appointees in 
the provincial courts do exclude evidence more frequently than liberals or 
conservatives, the differences are not statistically significant.133 Further, when 
we compare the exclusion rate of liberal and conservative appointees, we see an 
almost identical rate in provincial courts (72%) and a statistically insignificant 
1.2% difference in superior courts (64.0% for liberal appointees and 65.2% 
for conservative appointees).134 This suggests that liberal and conservative 
appointees vote similarly regardless of court level. Overall, party of appointment 
does not appear to explain the difference between provincial and superior court 
exclusion rates.
Now consider the interaction between court level and professional 
background. As seen in Table 9, above, provincial court judges with criminal 
defence or non-criminal practice backgrounds excluded evidence at a virtually 
identical rate (76.9% versus 76.5%).135 Judges who were prosecutors, however, 
had an exclusion rate of 65.9%, a full 11 percentage points lower than the other 
two categories.136 
In the superior courts, the exclusion rates were 71.9% for criminal defence, 
59.5% for prosecution, and 64.4% for non-criminal practice backgrounds. 
However, only the defence and prosecution rates were significantly different 
from each other.137 There was no statistically significant difference between 
non-criminal lawyers and defence or Crown lawyers, individually or combined.138 
In the superior courts, knowing that a judge had a non-criminal practice is not 
predictive of exclusion, but knowing that a judge had been a prosecutor or 
criminal defence lawyer is.
133. The t-statistic for social democrats versus liberals and conservatives combined is 1.33; for 
social democrat versus liberal, it is 1.24; and for social democrat versus conservative it is 1.13. 
None is significant at the 5% or 10% level.
134. The t-statistic for liberal versus conservative in provincial court is 0.02 (not significant 
at the 5% or 10% level); for liberal versus conservative in superior court, it is 0.30 (not 
significant at 5% or 10%).
135. The t-statistic for defence versus non-criminal is 0.12 (not significant at the 
5% or 10% level).
136. The t-statistic for Crown versus defence is 3.01 (significant at the 5% level); for Crown versus 
non-criminal, it is 2.81 (significant at the 5% level).
137. The t-statistic for defence versus Crown is 2.01 (significant at the 5% level).
138. The t-statistic for Crown versus non-criminal Crown lawyers is 1.02 (not significant at the 
5% or 10% level); for non-criminal versus defence lawyers, it is 1.41 (not significant at 5% 
or 10%); for non-criminal versus Crown and defence lawyers combined in provincial court, 
it is 1.36 (not significant at 5% or 10%); for non-criminal versus Crown and defence lawyers 
combined in superior court, it is 0.11 (not significant at 5% or 10%).
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What happens when we add gender to the mix? Not much. The strongest 
predictor of exclusion rates continues to be professional background. Table 
12, below, shows the exclusion rates in the two levels of court conditional on 
judges’ gender and professional background. More patterns have emerged now 
that there are twelve ways to categorize the judges. By testing every possible 
two-way combination within each level of court, we can see which judicial 
characteristics correlate with statistically significant differences in exclusion rates. 
In the provincial courts, male judges with criminal defence backgrounds exclude 
evidence more frequently than former prosecutors of either gender. Similarly, 
in provincial courts, judges with non-criminal backgrounds exclude evidence at 
a higher rate than prosecutors regardless of gender. 
In the superior courts, male criminal defence lawyers were more likely to 
exclude evidence than male prosecutors.139 There were additional significant 
differences between various subcategories across the levels of court. We do not 
address those here. The overall finding is that professional background appears to 
make a substantial difference in provincial courts and a lesser (but still significant) 
difference in the superior courts.
TABLE 12: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION LEVEL OF COURT, JUDGES’ 
GENDER, AND JUDGES’ BACKGROUND
Provincial Superior
Crown Defence Other Crown Defence Other
Male Number 170 307 246 100 76 200
Rate 65.9 76.9 75.2 59.0 71.1 64.5
Female Number 97 53 65 26 20 112
Rate 66.0 77.7 81.5 61.5 75.0 64.3
Total Number 267 360 311 126 96 312
Rate 65.9 76.9 76.5 59.5 71.9 64.4
We also examined exclusion rates conditional on gender and party of 
appointment. Although there were differences in the superior courts, none is 
statistically significant.140 In provincial court, in contrast, the following pairwise 
comparisons are significant (with the group on the left more likely to exclude 
than that on the right):141
139. See “Appendix,” Part VI, below, Table A.
140. See “Appendix,” Part VI, below, Table B.
141. See “Appendix,” Part VI, below, Table C.
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• Female social democrats > female liberals; 
• Male social democrats > female liberals;
• Male liberals > female liberals; and
• Female conservatives > female liberals.
What stands out most here, perhaps counterintuitively, is that female judges 
appointed by liberal provincial governments are less likely to exclude evidence 
than any other party–gender combination.
 We also examined exclusion rates conditional on professional background 
and party of appointment.142 In the superior courts, the only statistically 
significant finding is that conservative defence lawyers excluded evidence more 
often than conservative prosecutors. We found more significant differences in the 
provincial courts as follows:
• liberal non-criminal > social democratic Crown;
• conservative non-criminal > liberal Crowns; 
• social democratic defence > conservative Crown;
• social democrats non-criminal > social democratic Crown;
• social democratic defence > social democratic Crown;
• liberal non-criminal > liberal Crown; 
• social democratic other > liberal Crown;
• liberal defence > liberal Crown; and 
• social democratic defence > liberal Crown.143 
This suggests that at the provincial level, judges’ professional background is 
a weighty factor, with a prosecutorial experience mattering most. Party of 
appointment matters in some instances, but not to the same degree. 
While the results reported in Tables 12–14 highlight differences within the 
provincial courts, there are also significant differences between the exclusion rates 
of provincial and superior courts across the categories of gender, background, 
and party of appointment. Significant differences also arise when jurisdiction is 
considered. We do not report these findings, however, as analyzing each possible 
two-way combination would be unduly lengthy. Instead, as detailed in the next 
section, we apply a multivariate analysis to gauge the marginal impact of each 
external variable on the exclusionary decision.
142. See “Appendix,” Part VI, below, Table D.
143. See “Appendix,” Part VI, below, Table E.
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7. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Our logistical regression model takes the decision to admit or exclude evidence 
as the dependent or “explained” outcome.144 We then control for each identified 
variable to measure its significance on the exclusionary decision. 
Tables 15–18 below display the base outcome as “exclude,” so the measure of 
each independent or “explanatory” variable shows whether it is more likely to result 
in admission. The first column displays the explanatory variables: judges’ gender 
(with female as the starting point); judges’ pre-appointment background (with 
Crown as the starting point); and judges’ party of appointment (with conservative 
as the starting point). The constant reported at the bottom is the model’s starting 
point, i.e., a female prosecutor appointed by a conservative government. 
The result for each explanatory variable is reported in the second column in 
the “relative odds” format with its associated p-value in the third column.145 For 
example, consider the constant shown in Table 15 below: a female, conservative 
Crown. The strict interpretation of the 0.61 odds ratio for that judge is that the 
ratio of admission to exclusion is 61%, i.e., the odds that she will admit the 
evidence are 61% relative to the likelihood that she will exclude it. Such a judge 
would admit the evidence 38% of the time and exclude it 62% of the time.146 
What emerges from Table 15 is that former criminal defence lawyers and 
former non-criminal lawyers are even less likely than the baseline judge to admit 
the evidence. For example, the odds for a female liberal defence counsel can be 
calculated by multiplying 0.61 x 0.96 x 0.56 = 33%. This means that a female, 
liberal-appointed judge with a background in criminal defence will admit at a 
rate of 33% of her exclusion rate, equating to a 25% chance of admission and 
75% chance of exclusion. 
144. This is the same method used by Stribopoulos & Yahya, supra note 42 at 329-42. 
145. The definition of the relative odds (also known as the odds ratio) is the probability of an 
event divided by the probability of a non-event. Imagine drawing a ball from a box with 
three colored balls (red, yellow, and blue). If the probability of drawing a red ball were 1/3, 
then the probability of the non-event would be 2/3. The odds ratio of drawing a red ball 
can therefore be expressed as 1/2, 50%, or 1:2. If one knew the odds ratio for drawing a 
red ball were 50%, one could also infer that the probability of drawing a non-red ball was 
1/50%, or 2, which means that probability of drawing a non-red ball was twice that of 
drawing a red ball.
146. Since the odds ratio is the odds of the event divided by the odds of the non-event, then 61% 
= probability of event / (1 - probability of event), which implies that the probability of the 
event is 1/(1+(1/0.61)) = 38%.
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TABLE 15: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS OF EXCLUSIONARY DECISION (ADMIT 
OR EXCLUDE) AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS AS 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 








Social Democrat 0.668279 0.026*
Constant (Female + Conservative + Crown) 0.610201 0.002*
Base Outcome: Exclude
* indicates significance at the 5% level
** indicates significance at the 10% level
Log Likelihood = -881.73
Number of observations = 1,470
pseudo R2= 0.0124
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) = 1771.46 
To see this more concretely, look again at Table 12, above. Table 12 contains the 
rates for judges by level of court, gender, and background. One can construct 
numbers from that table that indicate that the number of admissions by “female + 
liberal + defence counsel” was seventeen out of a total of seventy-three decisions. 
This means that these judges had a 23% admission rate, which results in an odds 
ratio of 23/77 = 30.4%. While this is not exactly 33%, keep in mind that Table 
12 does not include party of appointment. Had we been able to construct a 
four-way table, the odds would have been closer to 33%. This is the advantage of 
the multivariate logistic approach. 
Table 15 also shows that judicial gender is statistically insignificant, and 
the only political affiliation that matters is a social democratic relative to a 
conservative counterpart. In other words, professional background matters more 
than gender or party.
When we add the level of court as an explanatory variable, Table 16, below, 
results. In this model, the baseline judge is a female prosecutor appointed by 
a conservative government to a provincial court. The odds that such a judge 
will admit evidence are lower than in Table 15, and the difference is statistically 
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significant. This means that presence on a superior court makes exclusion less 
likely. As with the model in Table 15, professional background is significant, and 
gender is insignificant. 
However, when court level is included, party of appointment becomes 
insignificant. This supports the finding discussed in Part III(C)(6), above, that 
the difference in exclusion rates between the two courts is not an artifact of 
differential party of appointment distributions. In other words, it appears that 
the difference arises from factors intrinsic to the level of court itself and not from 
any of the control variables such as gender or party of appointment. 
TABLE 16: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS OF EXCLUSIONARY DECISION (ADMIT 
OR EXCLUDE) AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND 
COURT LEVEL AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Variables Relative Odds P-value
Court: Superior 1.457197 0.005*






Social Democrat 0.827355 0.338
Constant (Female + Provincial Court + Crown + 
Conservative) 0.491319 0*
Base outcome: exclude
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
** indicates significance at the 10% level
Log Likelihood = -877.74
Number of observations = 1,470
pseudo R2= 0.0169
AIC = 1771.486
Lastly, we added the jurisdiction variable, with results reported in Table 17, 
below. The model’s baseline is a female prosecutor appointed to the provincial 
court by a conservative government in Alberta. This regression reveals that judges 
in British Columbia, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Quebec are significantly 
less likely to admit evidence than those in Alberta. As in the previous regressions, 
professional background and court level are statistically significant; gender and 
party of appointment are not.
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TABLE 17: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS OF EXCLUSIONARY DECISION (ADMIT 
OR EXCLUDE) AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS, 
COURT LEVEL, AND JURISDICTION AS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Variables Relative Odds P-value




















Social Democrat 0.945887 0.807
Constant: (Female + Provincial Court + Alberta + 
Crown + Conservative) 0.702862 0.132
Base outcome: exclude
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
** indicates significance at the 10% level
Log Likelihood = -862.809
Number of observations = 1,470
pseudo R2= 0.0336
AIC = 1765. 619
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The overall conclusion to be drawn from these models is that professional 
background, court level, and jurisdiction help to predict exclusionary decisions; 
gender and party of appointment do not. 
As we explore more fully in Part IV, below, in our view, the significance 
of professional background and jurisdiction provides support for the attitudinal 
model of adjudication. In other words, judges’ practice background and 
(in some cases) jurisdiction influence their decision as to whether to exclude 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter 
regardless of legal considerations and case characteristics. Court level, in contrast, 
is likely an artifact of the fact that, on average, superior courts try more serious 
criminal offences than provincial courts. While this is not an aspect of attitudinal 
judging, it does support the hypothesis that, regardless of doctrinal admonitions 
to the contrary, judges are less inclined to exclude evidence obtained from Charter 
violations for more serious crimes. 
D. INTERNAL VARIABLES
1. NON-DOCTRINAL VARIABLES
We next tested for the effect of case-specific, “internal” variables on the decision 
to admit or exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Charter. These variables 
may be grouped into two categories. The first consists of case characteristics 
that might plausibly influence the exclusionary decision but are not directly 
considered in the doctrine. In other words, they fall (mostly) outside the scope 
of positive law. We examined the accused’s gender, the type of offence, the type 
of evidence obtained, and whether the judge considered the seriousness of the 
offence to be a significant factor (“treatment of offence seriousness”). 
The latter variable requires further explanation. As discussed in Part I(B), 
above, the jurisprudence is ambiguous on whether crime severity counts in the 
Grant analysis. Some courts take the view that it is a neutral factor. Others have 
held that, all else equal, courts should be more reluctant to exclude evidence in 
more serious cases than less serious ones.147 We therefore coded decisions as giving 
this factor either a neutral treatment (offence seriousness treated as insignificant 
or not discussed) or a positive one (offence seriousness treated as significant). 
147. Note that the judge classified the offence as being anything less than moderately serious in 
only twenty-four out of 1,472 cases (1.6%). The evidence was excluded in all but two of 
these cases, and in only half of those twenty-four cases did the judge state that the relative 
non-seriousness of the offence weighed in favour of admission.
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To assess the influence of these variables, we ran a logistic regression. Table 
18, below, shows the results of the estimation. The baseline case is a trial in the 
Provincial Court of Alberta with multiple accused (at least one of each gender) 
charged with a child pornography offence. The evidence sought to be excluded 
is child pornography, and the judge has treated offence seriousness as a neutral 
factor. The baseline judicial characteristics remain a female prosecutor appointed 
by a conservative government. 
As shown in Table 18, below, this regression confirmed the continuing 
significance of jurisdiction for British Columbia, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, 
and Quebec, compared to Alberta. Professional background also remains 
significant in the same manner as before. Among the new internal variables, 
gender of the accused is significant, raising the odds of exclusion substantially. 
As discussed in Part I(A)(1), above, this is consistent with research suggesting that 
criminal courts treat female defendants more leniently than males. 
The “treatment of offence seriousness” variable also proved significant, raising 
the odds of admission dramatically (in the order of two to four times). Notably, 
when we added this variable to the model, the previously observed difference 
between provincial and superior courts disappeared. As we elaborate in Part 
IV(B), below, this supports the inference that the difference between provincial 
and superior courts’ exclusion rates stems from the more serious nature of the 
offences tried in the latter.  
Lastly, with one exception, neither offence type nor evidence type proved 
significant.148 The exception is for evidence characterized as “statements of 
the accused,” which substantially increases the odds of exclusion. However, 
as discussed in Part I(B) (and further elaborated in Part III(D)(2)), above, the 
characterization of evidence as a statement of the accused (as compared to 
any other type of evidence) weighs in favour of exclusion under positive law. 
The subcategorizations that we used for non-statement evidence (e.g., child 
pornography, drugs, firearms, impaired driving samples) are not doctrinal factors 
and do not appear to have any significant effect on the exclusionary decision.149 
148. At the court of appeal level, in contrast, Hausegger, McNabb, and Riddell found that 
weapons and drugs (as well as statements) were more likely to be admitted, controlling for 
other variables. Supra note 4 at 14, Tables 3 & 4.
149. This finding contradicts previous research showing differential exclusion rates for various 
types of physical evidence, including distinctly lower exclusion rates for guns. See Madden, 
“Marshalling,” supra note 3 at 242-46; Asselin, “Trends,” supra note 3, Table 8; Jochelson, 
Huang & Murchison, supra note 3, Table 6; Johnson, Jochelson & Weir, supra note 3, Table 
21. These studies, it should be noted, did not test for statistical significance and did not 
control for other variables.
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TABLE 18: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS OF EXCLUSIONARY DECISION (ADMIT 
OR EXCLUDE) AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS, 
























Judge’s Party of Appointment:
Liberal 1.094424 0.548
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TABLE 18: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS OF EXCLUSIONARY DECISION (ADMIT 
OR EXCLUDE) AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND JUDICIAL CHARACTERISTICS, 
























Constant: Provincial Court + Alberta + Conser-
vative + Both Genders + Child Porn Offence + 
Child Porn Evidence + Offence Insignificant
0.607367 0.449
Base outcome: exclude
* indicates significance at the 5% level 
** indicates significance at the 10% level
Log Likelihood = -784.969
Number of observations = 1,470
pseudo R2= 0.1208
AIC = 1659.94
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2. DOCTRINAL VARIABLES
I. NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE
As mentioned, the pre-Grant jurisprudence drew a sharp distinction between 
(1) statements of the accused and compelled bodily samples, and (2) other 
evidence. Evidence from the former category was almost always subject to an 
exclusionary presumption; evidence from the latter was not. Consistent with this 
dichotomy, our sample of 2007 cases shows high exclusion rates for statements 
(n=27, 85.2%) and samples (n=51, 86.3%) and a substantially lower rate for 
other evidence (n=84, 64.3%).150 As a result of Grant, most would have predicted 
a sharply reduced exclusion rate for samples (indeed, the Court in Grant strongly 
hinted at this) and unchanged exclusion rates for statements (which are still 
subject to an exclusionary presumption) and other evidence (which Grant did 
not directly affect).
Our data mostly confirms these predictions. The 2013–2018 exclusion 
rate is 73% for bodily samples, 86.3% for statements, and 63.45% for other 
evidence.151 Comparing the two time periods, only the exclusion rates for bodily 
samples are significantly different.152 The post-Grant bodily sample rate, however, 
is higher than many would have predicted immediately after Grant. Though 
substantially lower than the rate in 2007 (86%), it remains higher than the 
overall rate. Given the Court’s expressed preference in Grant for the admission 
of this kind of evidence, this is perhaps a surprising result. But as noted in Part 
I(B), above, many lower courts have found that the taking of bodily samples 
(overwhelmingly, breath samples from impaired driving stops) often involves 
serious police misconduct that intrudes substantially on drivers’ liberty interests. 
In light of this jurisprudence, the 73% exclusion rate (very close to the overall 
rate) is less surprising.
150. The difference between the average exclusion rates for sample, statement, and other is 
statistically significant at the 5% level, with t-statistics of 2.76 and 2.11 respectively. 
The difference between the exclusion rates for sample and statement are not statistically 
significant at the 5% or 10% level, with a t-statistic of 0.1. 
151. The differences between these rates of exclusion are statistically significant at the 5% 
level, with t-statistics of 3.82 when comparing sample with others, 6.18 when comparing 
statement with others, and 3.54 when comparing statement with sample.
152. The t-statistic was 2.02, which is significant at the 5% level. 
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II. “OBTAINED IN A MANNER” THAT VIOLATES THE CHARTER
As mentioned in Part I(B), above, evidence is not eligible for exclusion under 
section 24(2) unless it was “obtained in a manner” that violated the Charter.153 
We did not include cases in our database if this criterion was not met. However, 
in most included cases (85%), the court did not discuss the issue, presumably 
because the prosecution did not contest it. It was assumed by the court and 
parties, in other words, that the evidence was obtained in a manner infringing 
at least one Charter right. Not surprisingly, when the issue was contested, the 
exclusion rate (61.3%) was significantly lower than the average rate (70.4%).154 
This can be explained by the fact that when the connection between the violation 
and the state’s acquisition of the evidence is weak, the court is (all else equal) more 
likely to find that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute.155
III. GRANT FACTORS
As mentioned in Part I(B), above, in Grant, the Court decreed that three factors 
drive the exclusionary discretion: the seriousness of the Charter-infringing police 
conduct, its impact on the claimant’s Charter-protected interests, and society’s 
interests in an adjudication on the merits. As shown in Table 19, below, our 
data unsurprisingly confirm that trial judges exclude evidence significantly more 
than the average when they characterize the Charter-infringing state conduct as 
“serious” (91.7%); “moderate” violations result in excluded evidence less than half 
of the time (45.9%); and “slight” infringements even less frequently (11.7%).156
 
TABLE 19: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY SERIOUSNESS OF 
STATE MISCONDUCT
Moderate N/A Serious Slight
Number 90 43 870 33
Rate 45.9 93.5 91.7 11.7
153. Charter, supra note 1, s 24(2).
154. The t-statistic for the difference between the two exclusion rates was 3.24, which is 
statistically significant at the 5% level.
155. See generally Grant, supra note 74 at para 122; Côté, supra note 84 at paras 66-70. 
156. When comparing the mean exclusion rate for N/A (seriousness not assessed) with 
moderate, the t-statistic is 8.99; serious versus moderate the t-statistic is 18.06; slight versus 
moderate, the t-statistic is 11.37; serious versus N/A, the t-statistic is 0.37; slight versus 
N/A, the t-statistic is 15.92; and slight versus serious, the t-statistic is 36.45. These are all 
statistically significantly different from each other at the 5% level, with the exception of 
serious versus N/A. 
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Table 20 similarly shows that exclusion is highly probable when judges gauge the 
violation’s impact on the claimant to be “serious” (92.4%). “Moderate” effects are 
associated with only a modest diminishment of exclusion (64.6%) compared to 
the overall rate, and “slight” impacts rarely result in exclusion (13.9%).157 
TABLE 20:  THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY IMPACT OF 
VIOLATION ON ACCUSED
Moderate N/A Serious Slight
Number 113 65 810 48
Rate 64.6 90.3 92.4 13.9
As mentioned in Part I(B), above, a finding that evidence would have been 
discovered without the Charter breach diminishes (but does not extinguish) 
its impact on the accused.158 However, as indicated in Table 21, below, courts 
assessed the discoverability question in only 17% of cases, excluding evidence at 
a rate of 18.4% when they found that the evidence was discoverable and 97.8% 
when it was not.159
TABLE 21: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY WHETHER EVIDENCE 
WAS DISCOVERABLE
N/A Discoverable Not Discoverable
Number 918 29 89
Rate 75.1 18.4 97.8
As discussed in Part I(B), above, under the “adjudication on the merits” category, 
judges consider the evidence’s reliability and importance to the prosecution’s 
case. The more reliable and important the evidence, the more likely it will be 
157. When comparing the mean exclusion rate for N/A (impact not assessed) with moderate, 
the t-statistic was 5.75; serious versus moderate, the t-statistic is 10.51; slight versus 
moderate, the t-statistic is 17.16; serious versus N/A, the t-statistic is 0.53; slight versus 
N/A, the t-statistic is 18.5; and slight versus serious, the t-statistic is 38.85. These are all 
statistically significantly different from each other at the 5% level, with the exception of 
serious versus N/A. 
158. When the evidence was found to be not discoverable, the judge characterized the impact of 
the violation as being “serious” 91% of the time (81/89). 
159. The t-statistic for comparing the mean exclusion rate for “not discoverable” with 
“discoverability assumed” (N/A) is 5.03; not discoverable versus N/A, the t-statistic is 16.11; 
and discoverable versus not discoverable, the t-statistic is 14.50. All of these differences are 
statistically significant at the 5% level.
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admitted. Though they may also consider the seriousness of the offence, this 
factor is doctrinally equivocal. It may be interpreted as either a neutral factor or 
one that weighs (at least slightly) in favour of admission.
Somewhat surprisingly, trial judges referred to reliability in only 61% of cases. 
This may be explained by the fact that reliability issues arise almost exclusively 
with statement evidence, which comprise only 13% of cases. As shown in Table 
22, below, when the evidence was found to be reliable, the exclusion rate was 
64.1%. Evidence deemed unreliable was almost always excluded (96.1%).160 
However, we can assume that in cases in which the issue was not mentioned, the 
evidence was reliable. Adding these cases to those where reliability was expressly 
found yields an exclusion rate of 69.5%, only 1% lower than the overall rate. 
It thus appears that, while unreliable evidence is almost always excluded, the 
fact that evidence is prima facie reliable has little if any effect on the section 
24(2) decision.
TABLE 22: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY RELIABILITY OF EVIDENCE
N/A Reliable Unreliable
Number 408 579 49
Rate 78.8 64.1 96.1
As expected, the more important a judge considers the evidence to be, the less 
likely it will be excluded (see Table 23, below). The effect of this factor appears 
to be modest, however. In 39% of cases, judges did not even refer to it. In these 
cases, evidence was excluded 74.1% of the time. In an equal proportion of 
cases (39%), judges considered the impugned evidence to be “critical,” yet still 
excluded evidence 68% of the time. 
Counterintuitively, the exclusion rate was lower (52.4%) when judges 
gauged the evidence to be merely “important.”161 We speculate that this anomaly 
can be explained by the significantly higher than average exclusion rate for “over 
160. The t-statistics for comparing the mean exclusion rate for reliable with N/A (reliability not 
assessed) is 5.92; unreliable versus N/A is 2.63; and reliable versus unreliable is 4.94. These 
are all statistically significant differences at the 5% level.
161. The t-statistics for comparing the mean exclusion rate for important with critical is 3.99; 
moderate versus critical is 2.63; N/A (importance not assessed) versus critical is 2.33; slight 
versus critical is 3.42; moderate versus important is 5.18; N/A versus important is 5.56; 
slight versus important is 5.50; N/A versus moderate is 1.93; slight versus moderate is 0.32; 
and slight versus N/A is 2.33. These are all statistically significant differences at the 5% level, 
except the N/A comparison with moderate, which is significant at the 10% level, and the 
slight with moderate comparison, which is statistically insignificant.
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0.80” impaired driving cases (74.0%),162 where the prosecution’s case typically 
collapses when bodily sample evidence is excluded.163 
TABLE 23: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY EVIDENTIARY IMPORTANCE 
Critical Important Moderate N/A Slight
Number 393 89 62 430 62
Rate 68.0 52.4 84.9 74.1 87.3
Lastly, offence seriousness does not appear to play a significant role in section 
24(2) trial decisions as a matter of positive law. As shown in Table 24, below, 
in almost a third of cases, the judge did not refer to it. The exclusion rate in these 
cases (70.8%) was only fractionally greater than the overall rate (70.4%). When 
offence seriousness was considered, judges classified the offence as “serious” 90.5% 
of the time. The exclusion rate in these cases was only slightly lower (68.5%) than 
the overall rate. This could be interpreted as a signal that courts have generally 
interpreted Grant as effectively nullifying this factor. 
TABLE 24: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY OFFENCE SERIOUSNESS 
Moderate N/A Serious Slight
Number 42 478 494 22
Rate 80.8 70.8 68.5 91.7
However, as discussed in Part III(D)(1), above, we also coded for how judges 
treated the offence seriousness factor. As shown in Table 25, below, most (56%) 
did not speak to the question. The exclusion rate for this group was 71.2%. 
Of those who did, 27% said that it was not significant; the remaining 73% said 
it was “significant” or “weighty.” In the former group, the exclusion rate was 
85.3%; in the latter, it was 60.9%.164 This suggests that judges who do express a 
162. The average exclusion rate for all other categories of offences was 67.3%, and the t-statistic 
for the difference between the average exclusion rate for the impaired category and all others 
was 2.85, which is statistically significant at the 5% level.
163. Judges gauged the bodily sample evidence to be “critical” to the prosecution’s case in 78% of 
cases where some characterization was given. Statements (17%) and other evidence (65%) 
were less often characterized as critical. 
164. The t-statistic for the difference between the mean exclusion rate for N/A (significance of 
offence seriousness not discussed) with insignificant is 4.14; significant versus insignificant is 
6.54; and significant versus N/A is 3.81. These are all statistically significantly different from 
each other at the 5% level.
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view on the factor’s significance are more likely to exclude (factor insignificant) 
or admit (factor significant) than judges who do not. And as shown in Table 
18, above, our regression model including non-doctrinal variables suggests that 
offence seriousness exerts some influence on exclusionary decisions regardless of 
doctrinal treatment.
TABLE 25: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY TREATMENT OF “OFFENCE 
SERIOUSNESS” FACTOR
N/A Insignificant Significant
Number 586 191 259
Rate 71.2 85.3 60.9
We combined all of these factors into one regression as shown in Table 26, below. 
Consistent with the findings discussed above, exclusion was significantly favoured 
when: (1) the state misconduct was serious, (2) the impact of the violation 
on the accused’s Charter-protected interests was serious, (3) the evidence was 
non-discoverable, (4) the evidence was unreliable, (5) the evidence was less 
than important to the prosecution’s case, or (6) the evidence was a statement 
or bodily sample. Admission was significantly favoured when: (1) the evidence 
was expressly found to have been obtained in a manner that violates the Charter, 
(2) the misconduct was slight, (3) the impact on the accused was slight, (4) the 
evidence was discoverable, and (5) the seriousness of the offence was treated as 
a significant factor. The classification of an offence as “serious” also weighed in 
favour of admission (but is significant only at the 10% level).
TABLE 26: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS OF EXCLUSIONARY DECISION 
(ADMIT OR EXCLUDE) AS DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND GRANT FACTORS AS 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Admit Relative odds P-value
Court
Superior 1.262714 0.432

























Sample  0.245928 0*
Statement 0.20985 0.001*





* indicates significance at the 5% level
** indicates significance at the 10% level
Log Likelihood = -253.58
Number of observations = 1,472
pseudo R2= 0.7165
AIC = 555.18
165. The constant is a trial in provincial court where the “obtained in a manner” issue is “not 
discussed (N/A)”; seriousness of the state misconduct is “moderate”; discoverability 
of the evidence is “not discussed (N/A)”; impact on the accused’s Charter-protected 
interests is “moderate”; importance of the evidence to the Crown is “critical”; reliability 
of the evidence is “not discussed (N/A)”; seriousness of the offence is “moderate”; 
treatment of offence seriousness is “insignificant,” and the type of evidence category was 
“non-statement, non-sample.”
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IV. DISCUSSION
A. EXTERNAL VARIABLES
Our analysis suggests that the decision about whether to exclude unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence at trial is influenced by certain extra-legal factors but not 
others. Consistent with most previous studies of Canadian judges, we found little 
evidence that party of appointment plays a significant role. In some respects, this 
may be surprising. Whether evidence should be excluded as a remedy for rights 
violations has generally been viewed as a contentious policy question dividing 
conservatives and liberals.166 The governing doctrine also ostensibly gives trial 
judges wide latitude to admit or exclude evidence as they see fit: They are free 
to make factual findings, frame the governing doctrinal factors, and weigh those 
findings and factors in the context of an open-ended balancing test.
Why, then, is party of appointment not significantly correlated with 
exclusion? Unfortunately, our study cannot provide an answer. As indicated, 
previous research has suggested several possibilities, including a tradition of 
non-ideological judicial appointments in Canada, the tendency of trial courts to 
adjudicate non-ideologically, and the weak predictive value of partisanship and 
other ideology measures in criminal cases.167
We also found that judicial gender was not predictive of exclusion. 
While we observed some significant pairwise differences (in provincial courts, 
liberal-appointed female judges were more likely to admit than most other 
gender-party combinations), gender was not significant in our regression models. 
In other words, once we controlled for other external factors, judicial gender was 
no longer significant. Previous research has revealed no consistent overarching 
judicial gender effect in either adjudication generally or in criminal cases. Our 
analysis is consistent with this pattern.
Professional background, in contrast, did correlate strongly with the 
exclusion decision. Former prosecutors are less likely to exclude evidence than 
former non-criminal practitioners, who are in turn less likely to exclude evidence 
than former criminal defence lawyers. This finding is consistent with research in 
the United States showing similar correlations between professional background 
166. See generally Kent Roach, Due Process and Victims’ Rights: The New Law and Politics 
of Criminal Justice (University of Toronto Press, 1999) at 46-47, 76-77; Lane V 
Sunderland, “Liberals, Conservatives, and the Exclusionary Rule” (1980) 71:4 J Crim L & 
Criminology 343.
167. See discussion in Part 1(A), above.
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and rulings in criminal cases generally.168 We cannot say whether this stems from 
pre-professional selection bias, post-professional experience, or a combination 
of both. But our study supports the widespread anecdotal impression that 
prosecutors and defence lawyers are different (both from each other and from 
non-criminal lawyers)169 and that this difference carries over into the judicial role.
While we do not purport to suggest ideal criteria for judicial selection, our 
findings could be interpreted as supporting the appointment of judges from a 
variety of professional backgrounds, including a roughly equal ratio of former 
defence lawyers and former prosecutors. There is no reason to think that either 
prosecutors or defence counsel should not be appointed in significant numbers. 
Indeed, heavy criminal caseloads (especially in provincial court) suggest that a 
criminal practice background is desirable. Any substantial change in the ratio 
of prosecutors to defence counsel, however, would likely shift the exclusion rate 
(and potentially other decisions in criminal cases) away from the status quo. 
Jurisdiction also correlates with exclusion, at least for British Columbia, 
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Quebec (more likely to exclude evidence) in 
relation to Alberta (less likely). This also tracks anecdotal experience. The reasons 
for this are not obvious and are not explained by differential distributions in 
party of appointment. The most that we can say is that there are aspects of the 
political, legal, or judicial cultures in these provinces that lead to more “liberal” 
or “conservative” outcomes in at least this area of the law, regardless of party of 
appointment and other factors. 
Whether this is normatively optimal is a matter of opinion. On the one hand, 
jurists have long asserted that jurisdictional differences in the administration of 
criminal justice are a legitimate and desirable aspect of Canadian federalism.170 
On this view, the ability of judges and other justice system actors to apply the law 
in a manner sensitive to local conditions reflects and respects regional diversity 
and provincial autonomy. Moreover, the exclusionary discretion embodied in 
section 24(2) hinges on the justice system’s reputation, which presumably stems 
at least in part from its standing in the local community.
On the other hand, the power to enact and regulate the enforcement of 
laws relating to the criminal justice system lies exclusively with Parliament under 
section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867.171 The decision to give Parliament 
168. See supra notes 31-32.
169. See generally Abbe Smith, “Are Prosecutors Born or Made?” (2012) 25 Geo J Leg Ethics 943.
170. See R v Regan, 2002 SCC 12 at para 71; Dennis Baker, “The Provincial Power to (Not) 
Prosecute Criminal Code Offences” (2016) 48 Ottawa L Rev 417 at 441-42.
171. (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5.
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exclusive authority over this realm was deliberately designed to foster national 
unity.172 Even more important, to the extent that the provinces play a role in 
the administration of criminal and quasi-criminal law enforcement, their role 
is circumscribed by the Charter in the same manner that it is for the federal 
government.173 In this context, it may be reasonable to expect that remedies for 
fundamental rights violations be equally available to Canadians regardless of 
provincial boundaries.    
B. INTERNAL VARIABLES
As discussed, consistent with previous literature suggesting favourable treatment 
for female criminal defendants, judges are more likely to exclude evidence when 
the accused is a woman. It is doubtful that judges are conscious of this bias. 
Even if they were, we do not know whether they would be able to disabuse 
themselves of it.174 Nevertheless, it does not seem desirable that the accused’s 
gender should influence the decision about whether to exclude unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence.
We also found compelling evidence that the exclusionary decision is affected 
by the seriousness of the offence. Judges who indicated that offence seriousness 
was a significant consideration were much more likely to admit the evidence 
than those who did not. Moreover, when we included the “treatment of offence 
seriousness” variable in our regression model, the exclusion rate differential 
between provincial and superior courts disappeared. In other words, judges 
trying more serious offences (disproportionately in superior courts) are, all else 
equal, more inclined to admit evidence than those trying less serious ones.  
Whether this is normatively desirable is also contentious. To the extent 
that excluding probative evidence is a social cost (by making it more difficult to 
convict the factually guilty), that cost is undoubtedly greater for more serious 
offences than less serious ones.175 On the other hand, the regular admission of 
172. See Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2010 SCC 61 at paras 68, 77; Mark 
Carter, “Criminal Law in the Federal Context” in Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem & Nathalie 
Des Rosiers, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (Oxford University 
Press, 2017) 475 at 476.
173. See Charter, supra note 1, s 32(1).
174. See generally Jerry Kang et al, “Implicit Bias in the Courtroom” (2012) 59 UCLA L Rev 
1124; Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir, “Judicial Decision-Making: A Behavioral Perspective” 
in Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and 
the Law (Oxford University Press, 2014) 664 at 684-86.
175. See David M Paciocco, “Section 24(2): Lottery or Law—The Appreciable Limits of 
Purposive Reasoning” (2011) 58 Crim LQ 15 at 52-55.
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unconstitutionally obtained evidence in serious cases would likely erode law 
enforcement’s incentive to comply with the Charter, increasing the harms caused 
by rights violations to the factually guilty and innocent alike.176 
 As discussed, the Court has not issued a firm and consistent directive as to 
whether offence seriousness should be considered. The Court should clarify its 
position by directing trial judges to either count or not count offence seriousness 
in the exclusionary calculus. As the American experience demonstrates, even 
under the latter scenario, admission is still likely to be more common for the most 
serious offences. But a clear policy choice by the Court would likely limit this 
effect. If the Court chooses the opposite policy, trial judges could transparently 
weigh offence seriousness in the balance. 
V. CONCLUSION
In one sense, our study is very narrow. We examined only trial decisions involving 
a single question of constitutional criminal procedure: Whether evidence 
obtained in violation of the Charter should be excluded under section 24(2). 
However, trial judges confront this question many hundreds of times annually,177 
and their decision often dramatically influences the trial’s outcome. The decision 
is also a product of an open-ended balancing inquiry instantiating the liberal/due 
process versus conservative/crime control policy spectrum. Statistical analyses of 
the factors influencing this decision provide some insight on the extent to which 
judges’ decisions are shaped by non-legal, “Realist” factors.
The focus of previous research in this vein has been on judicial ideology. 
We found no significant correlation between party of appointment and section 
24(2) trial decisions. This is broadly consistent with previous research showing 
that party of appointment (1) does not strongly influence trial decisions 
in the United States; and (2) is not strongly predictive of case outcomes in 
Canadian appeal cases. 
Nor did we find any significant effect for judicial gender: Female and male 
judges’ exclusion rates are essentially the same, even when controlling for other 
176. See John AE Pottow, “Constitutional Remedies in the Criminal Context: A Unified 
Approach to Section 24 (Part III)” (2000) 44 Crim LQ 223 at 229-31; Penney, supra note 
77 at 138-39; Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, 2nd ed (Thomas Reuters 
Canada, 2019) at para 10.1730.
177. Recall from note 122 that we estimated that there were approximately 1,903 unreported 
decisions during the six-year period of our dataset, coupled with 1,472 reported ones. This 
yields an average of approximately 563 decisions per year.
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factors. This finding is also generally consistent with previous studies finding no 
strong, overarching judicial gender effect in criminal or non-criminal cases.
We did find significant effects, however, for two attitudinal factors that have 
received less attention in the literature: professional background and jurisdiction. 
Positive law does not dictate that accused persons have a better chance of having 
evidence excluded when being tried by a former criminal defence lawyer than by 
a former prosecutor. Nor does it support the finding that exclusion should be 
more common in British Columbia and Quebec than in Alberta. Yet these factors 
do appear to exert substantial influence on the exclusionary decision, as does the 
accused’s gender. 
That said, there is little doubt that positive law plays an important (and 
quite possibly dominant) role in exclusionary decisions. Our analysis of internal 
doctrinal variables shows that trial judges apply the law in the manner prescribed 
by the Supreme Court, with one possible and partial exception. While the doctrine 
states that offence seriousness should have (at most) a modest influence on section 
24(2) decisions, our analysis suggests that it often plays a substantial role.
Further empirical research on judicial decision-making in Canada, especially 
at the trial level, would be welcome. Perhaps the most obvious avenue would be 
to apply similar methodologies to other key decisions in criminal cases and other 
types of litigation. One might predict, for example, that in comparison to former 
criminal defence lawyers, former prosecutors are more likely to convict and to 
impose harsher sentences. Future studies might also investigate the possible 
influence of additional external variables (such as judicial age and experience)178 
or explore additional measures of judicial ideology.179  
178. See e.g. Hoffman et al, supra note 28.
179. See generally Cross, supra note 9 at 20-21.
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TABLE B: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY LEVEL OF COURT, JUDGES’ 
GENDER, AND JUDGES’ PARTY OF APPOINTMENT (“N/A” CATEGORY OMITTED)
Provincial Superior
Conservative Liberal Social Democrat Conservative Liberal
Male Number 217 336 163 253 123
Rate 70.5 74.4 76.1 66.0 61.0
Female Number 43 102 67 83 74
Rate 81.4 65.7 79.1 62.7 68.9
Total Number 260 438 230 336 197
Rate 72.3 72.4 77.0 65.2 64.0
TABLE C: THE VARIOUS PROVINCIAL COURT SUBCATEGORIES THAT ARE 
STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM EACH OTHER, INCLUDING THE 
T-STATISTIC AND LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE 
Subcategory One Compared to Subcategory Two
Gender & Party Gender & Party t-statistic
Level of 
Significance
Female Social Democrat Female Liberal 1.88 10
Male Social Democrat Female Liberal 1.81 10
Male Liberal Female Liberal 1.7 10
Female Liberal Female Conservative 1.9 10
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TABLE D: THE NUMBER AND RATE OF EXCLUSION BY LEVEL OF COURT, JUDGES’ 
BACKGROUND, AND JUDGES’ PARTY OF APPOINTMENT
Provincial Superior
Conservative Liberal Social Democrat Conservative Liberal
Crown Number 67 143 54 87 38
Rate 70.2 63.6 64.8 58.6 63.2
Defence Number 87 189 83 54 42
Rate 72.4 76.2 83.1 72.2 71.4
Other Number 106 106 93 195 117
Rate 73.6 77.4 78.5 66.2 61.5
Total 260 438 230 336 197
72.3 72.4 77.0 34.8 64.0
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TABLE E: VARIOUS SUBCATEGORIES BY COURT LEVEL THAT ARE STATISTICALLY 
SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM EACH OTHER, INCLUDING THE T-STATISTIC 
AND LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE  












Provincial Other Conservative Provincial 
Crown 
Liberal 1.71 10
Provincial Defence Social Democrat Provincial 
Crown 
Conservative 1.74 10










Provincial Non-criminal Liberal Provincial 
Crown 
Liberal 2.36 5
Provincial Non-criminal Social Democrat Provincial 
Crown 
Liberal 2.46 5
Provincial Defence Liberal Provincial Crown Liberal 2.50 5
Provincial Defence Social Democrat Provincial 
Crown 
Liberal 3.12 5
Superior Defence Conservative Superior
Crown 
Conservative 1.73 10
